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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background  
South-Asia is widely referred to as the least integrated region in the world. Moreover, although 
most states within the region have maintained consistent economic growth over the recent years, 
the region is still redolent of conflicts and poor records of human development. Regional 
integration is a highly complex phenomenon, with subjective variations in different (sub) 
regional contexts. The South-Asian region faces significant dilemmas for regional integration, 
owing primarily to the prevalent security concerns between India and Pakistan. The conflict in 
Kashmir is one of the most intractable and vehement conflicts in the world, which commenced in 
the second-half of the twentieth century, and has continued well into the twenty-first. Different 
scenarios are taking place around the globe in this second decade of the twenty-first century. The 
international community continues to witness advancements in a multitude of areas such as 
conventional and nuclear arms race, information revolution and subsequent cyber security and 
warfare, globalization of the economy, institutional glory and valor, the accentuation of 
normative vigor of ideas and perceptions, terrorist activities, piracy, and so on.  
The simultaneous rise in these various phenomena and more, pose an incrementally challenging 
burden on the singular explanatory and descriptive power of the mainstream schools of 
international relations theory. This is especially true in studying certain phenomena such as 
regional integration, where multiple schools of IR are at play, and this inhibits the dominion of 
one or even two modes of IR theory. Consequently, “a natural division of labor has emerged, 
wherein realists tend to focus upon the likelihood of war and stability, liberals on the conditions 
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leading to peace, and constructivists on the foundations of long-lasting or positive peace and the 
emergence of pluralistic security communities.”  Hence the goal is to move away from the “war 1
of paradigms” to address regional transformation through an intra- and inter-paradigmatic 
exchange.  Regional processes may also vary in terms of the level of political or economic 2
integration, which may impact the level of stability, and the ability of states and regional 
organizations to manage disputes within a region.  For instance, the regional scenario in Europe 3
is characterized as advanced in terms of integration, with institutions for specific purposes, 
including a common market, monetary policy, legal affairs, as well as conflict management. In 
contrast, the regional scenario in East Asia, and South-Asia is not as institutionalized, or 
integrated, as states in these regions have a very high regard for state sovereignty and non-
interference in the domestic affairs of member states.  
This study will illustrate the regional scenario in South-Asia, along with its nature and 
characteristics. The South-Asian region is at a delicate juncture today, largely due to the 
existence of an intractable conflict between the two regional powers i.e. India and Pakistan. 
Additionally, the integration scenario is interesting as the region is, in addition to being a 
significant security concern, also a nuclear hotspot between the two regional powers, with 
consistent operation of transnational terrorist organizations. Additionally, despite its existence as 
a regional organization, the South Asian Association for regional Cooperation (SAARC) has 
been unable to provide, or contribute towards regional cooperation and security. The dormancy 
 Paul, T. V ed., (2012). Strategies and Mechanisms of Regional Change. p-283.1
 The expression “war of paradigms” was coined by Harry Eckstein but was applied to the field of comparative 2
politics, see Eckstein, H. (1998). Unfinished Business,  pp.505-534. 
 Paul, T. V ed., (2012). Strategies and Mechanisms of Regional Change. pp. 283-298.3
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of SAARC can be elucidated largely from the enduring rivalry between India and Pakistan. 
Furthermore, the complex domestic political landscapes within the regional powers also add a 
sense of volatility for regional integration to manifest. Furthermore, elements of structural and 
cultural violence are predominant in the domestic structures of the rival nuclear powers.  
With a declining Western influence, today’s international system is incrementally being defined 
by interactions between regions and regional powers. Regional peace and a sense of community, 
which have been firmly established in the North Americas and Western Europe can be explained 
due to the lack (or resolution) of an intractable conflict between the major powers of those 
regions. It is difficult to imagine the EU, without resolution of the protracted conflict between 
France and Germany. It could thus be inductively argued that for regions to exist in peaceful 
manifestations, the rivalry between regional powers must be pacified. In other words, regional 
stability and community is contingent upon a positive peace between regional powers. 
Additionally, deductive reasoning suggests that for regional integration and transformation to 
materialize in South Asia, it is vital that the differences between India and Pakistan are 
peacefully resolved, either bilaterally, via international mediation, or through SAARC (with 
international support). A major portion of this study is therefore directed towards an investigation 
of the Kashmir conflict, and the prospects of international mediation towards its resolution.  
The proposal pertaining resolution of the Kashmir conflict is radical, but as this is not the 
objective of this study, it is outlined in Appendix 1. It essentially concerns converting Kashmir 
into a joint autonomous federal protectorate of India and Pakistan. Administration and 
governance will be based on representation, and funding from both parent states (including 
international funding). This option is proposed as both India and Pakistan claim Kashmir in its 
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entirety, and neither seem to be able to govern Kashmir and provide the necessary public goods, 
and establish a positive peace simultaneously. It could thus be a good idea to turn divergence into 
convergence.  
Additionally, it must be noted that mediation can only occur with the consent of India and 
Pakistan. And for this to happen, there needs to be mutually enticing opportunities for both 
countries, which regards cooperation and the benefits that come along as a far better option than 
continuing the conflict. For instance, the ECSC made cooperation between France and Germany 
more attractive, and relegated continuance of hostilities as unattractive. The difference between 
Europe and South-Asia is that the former was devastated after two world wars and hence a sense 
of desperation was prevalent for cooperation. Contrastingly, India and Pakistan seem to be 
accustomed to the manifest negative peace. Nevertheless, the desperation, or the ripe time for 
reconciliation is prevalent also in South-Asia like it was in Europe. This is mainly due to: 
structural violence, poor records of human development in the region, denial of human rights to 
the Kashmiri populace, and the inherent instability of Pakistan’s vastly growing nuclear arsenal 
in the backdrop of Jihadi terrorism. As this study will indicate, the terrorist scenario and its link 
with Pakistan’s intelligence agencies is complicated, and these violent non state actors often act 
during times of diplomatic engagement between New Delhi and Islamabad.  
Furthermore, this study will verify that hard power, i.e. economic and military might, has proved 
largely fruitless in the context of South-Asia. Billions of dollars worth of American aid (both 
economic and military) have proven largely futile, although not absolutely. In a similar vein, the 
hard power endowments of India, in the economic and military domains have also proved unable 
in generating New Delhi’s preferred outcomes from Islamabad. Therefore, it is important to 
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address the future of power in the region, demonstrating the apposite kinds of power, i.e. soft and 
smart power, which will be crucial prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia. 
Bilaterally, the efforts of India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir conflict have proved futile so 
far, and cannot be expected to materialize anytime soon. Therefore, mediation either through 
SAARC, or the apposite coalition of third-party mediators is expected to be the panacea for 
resolving the Kashmir conflict. This leads to the research question this study aims to explore.  
What are the prerequisites for the manifestation of regional integration in South-Asia?  
This study will seek to answer this research question by utilizing a multi-paradigmatic or eclectic 
approach, simultaneously composed of more than two schools of IR thought.  
The reason behind the choice of such an approach is to cast a wider theoretical net, as this study 
contains concepts, theories, and overall literature from a wide range of schools within the realm 
of IR. This approach will be further distributed in a top-down approach (which essentially entails 
elites and state governments), and a bottom-up approach (which entails the wider population). It 
is believed that a positive peace between India and Pakistan, resolution of the Kashmir conflict, 
and international mediation to materialize the resolution are vital prerequisites for regional 
integration in South-Asia. Additionally, soft and smart power will play a crucial role in regional 
integration, and eventual transformation.  
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1.2. Conceptualization of important elements  
1.2.1. Conceptualizing regional integration  
For the purposes of this study, it is essential to identify the characteristics of a region, and 
consequently define it as a “cluster of states that are proximate to each other and are 
interconnected in spatial, cultural, and ideational terms in a significant and distinguishable 
manner” as developed by T.V. Paul.  Additionally, in accordance with Buzan and Wæver, the 4
geographical element is also crucial in the conceptualization of a region.  Thus, the South-Asian 5
region encapsulates its eight constituent states, namely: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
Nepal, Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. This conceptualization is substantiated by the 
establishment of the regional organization SAARC in 1985.   6
Semantic confusion often arises in the study of regional integration, which is confounded with 
overlapping cognate activities. In order to ensure evaluative clarity, it is fundamental to a scholar 
of regional integration to exclude these other pursuits.  In other words, it is important to 7
distinguish between regional integration and other competing terms such as regionalism, regional 
cooperation, regional organization, regional movements, regional systems, or regional 
subsystems of a global system.  “Regional cooperation, organization, systems, and subsystems 8
 Paul, T. V. (2012). International Relations Theory And Regional Transformation. pp.283-298.4
 Buzan, B. and Wæver, O. (2003). Regions and powers. 5
 It is noteworthy that Afghanistan joined the organization in 2005, owing primarily to India’s bidding.6
 Ernst B. Haas (1970). The Study of Regional Integration, pp.606-646.7
 For a representative agenda of topics and articles illustrating the rubrics of the aforementioned competing terms 8
such as  regionalism, regional cooperation, regional organization, regional movements, regional systems, etc., see 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (ed.) (1968). International Regionalism: Readings.
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may help describe steps on the way, but they should not be confused with the resulting 
condition.”  Thus, as regional integration is unique and discrete from all previous systematic 9
studies of political unification, for the purpose of conceptual clarity in this study, regional 
integration is conceptualized as a “non-coercive” process, as developed by Ernst Haas.  In 10
accordance with Haas, it is evaluated as a process for the creation of political communities 
defined in institutional and attitudinal terms. This entails cooperation between regional members 
through regional institutions and common practices. 
Regional integration without reconciliation between India and Pakistan will manifest negative 
peace. Consequently, negative peace without reconciliation leads to structural violence. The 
appeasement of animosity between New Delhi and Islamabad will contribute towards abatement 
of structural violence, and manifestation of structural peace, i.e positive peace. In other words, 
regional integration in South-Asia is analogous with abatement of structural violence, and 
manifestation of structural peace. Without the reconciliation between New Delhi and Islamabad, 
the salient negative peace and structural violence will continue unhindered. In other words, 
without regional integration in South-Asia, structural violence will not be abated, and structural 
peace will not be manifested (and vice-versa, i.e without abatement of structural violence, and 
manifestation of structural peace, there will be no regional integration in South-Asia). The 
absence of personal as well as structural violence will make salient positive peace in South-Asia. 
The continuance of negative peace (absence of personal violence), and structural violence will 
inhibit regional integration. Without the absence of personal as well as structural violence, there 
 Nye, J. S. (1968). Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement,  pp. 856-858.9
 Ernst B. Haas (1970). The Study of Regional Integration. pp. 606-646.10
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will be no manifestation of positive peace. By means of abating structural violence, regional 
integration will contribute towards manifesting structural peace. 
1.2.2. Conceptualizing violence and peace  
Johan Galtung asserts “violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their 
actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations.”  This is relevant 11
with Kashmir, India, and Pakistan (as well as the region). This can be operationalized by the poor 
records of human development, and chronic poverty. Initially, Galtung developed two types of 
violence, namely: personal, and structural violence. Personal violence pertains after-war and/or 
between-war periods, including periods of negative peace, akin to frozen conflicts such as 
Kashmir. Furthermore, as the period protracts sufficiently for the outburst of personal violence to 
be partly forgotten, one could expect a concentration on structural violence.  Galtung conceives 12
of structural violence as something that shows a certain stability, whereas personal violence 
shows tremendous fluctuations over time. The condition of structural violence is often referred to 
as social injustice. The current scenario in Kashmir, in which human rights and property are 
violated, inhibiting their actual potential, is thus analogous with structural violence. The present 
study will not delve into the difference between personal and structural violence here, and 
instead recommend an overview of Galtung’s study.  
With this brief distinction the notion of violence becomes two-sided, as does the notion of peace, 
which is conceived of as the absence of violence. In Galtung’s words “an extended concept of 
 See Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace research. p-169.11
 See Galtung, J. (1969). pp.167-191.12
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violence leads to an extended concept of peace.” Akin to a coin with two sides, one side alone 
being only one aspect of the coin, not the complete coin, peace also has two sides: absence of 
personal violence, and absence of structural violence.  These in turn are referred to as negative 13
peace and positive peace.  
Galtung also posits that peace theory is intimately connected not only with conflict theory, but 
also with development theory. These two kinds of peace are pointed out, owing to the fact that 
the situation in Kashmir can be characterized by negative peace, and the aim of this this study is 
to search for a solution that allows positive peace. The third type of violence, i.e. cultural 
violence was developed essentially as a follow-up of Galtung’s introduction of the concept of 
structural violence. Cultural violence is defined as “any aspect of a culture that can be used to 
legitimize violence in its direct or structural form.”  Cultural violence pertains those aspects of 14
culture, the symbolic sphere of existence which is exemplified by religion and ideology, 
language and art, empirical science and formal science that can be used to justify or legitimize 
direct or structural violence.  Moreover, “the study of cultural violence highlights the way in 15
which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are legitimized and thus 
rendered acceptable in society.”  In other words, how the resource draining arms race in the face 16
of poverty and poor human development is justified to domestic constituencies. In agreement 
with Galtung, violence can be characterized as “avoidable insults to basic human needs, and 
more generally to life, lowering the real level of needs satisfaction below what is potentially 
 Ibid. p-183.13
 Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural Violence. pp.291-305.14
 Ibid. p-291.15
 Ibid.16
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possible.” Despite the symmetries there is a basic difference in the time relation of the three 
concepts of violence. Direct violence is an event; structural violence is a process with ups and 
downs; cultural violence is an invariant, remaining essentially the same for long periods.  17
Additionally, as per the conflict cycle developed by Michael Lund, the Kashmir conflict is 
currently at a phase of unstable peace, arguably deeming it frozen.  Such an attribute is 18
analogous to negative peace. 
1.2.3. Conceptualizing intractability and protraction  
Zartman asserts, “true intractability would mean that the subject area would always be in 
conflict. Nonetheless, some conditions of intractability may be longer lasting and less 
manipulable than others.”  To begin with, the five internal characteristics developed by Zartman 19
which combine to identify intractable conflicts are (1) protracted time; (2) identity denigration; 
(3) conflict profitability; (4) absence of ripeness; and (5) solution polarization. These are not 
causal elements for the conflict's initiation but rather processual features that evolve as the 
conflict continues and serve to develop and reinforce its intractability.  These characteristics 20
may be considered as causal elements in the conflict's intractability, but they are more 
appropriately considered as definitional elements that elucidate the challenge and complexity of 
 Galtung, J. (1977). Chapter-9.17
 Lund, M. (1996).  p-38.18
 Zartman, I.W. (2005). Analyzing Intractability. pp.47-64. The author discusses a set of contextual characteristics 19
associated with the mediation process plus a structural or geographic characteristic as well.
 Ibid. pp. 47-64.20
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intractability.  Zartman suggests that its also beneficial to perceive these as obstructing 21
characteristics that makes any effort to resolve, or transform such conflicts extremely difficult. In 
addition, he asserts that another significant feature of all these characteristics is their evolving 
and self-reinforcing nature. Even as identified, they are not static, i.e they grow, in both degree 
and nature, extending and defending themselves, so that efforts to overcome them must penetrate 
several layers and deal with their protective dynamics.    22
As it is redolent of scholarly analyses regarding the conflict in Kashmir as protracted in nature, a 
brief examination of the phenomena is in order. As Zartman asserts, protraction is a definitional 
characteristic of intractable conflict and is self-reinforcing, “intractability feeds on intractability 
and grows with the feeding.” Hence, a definition of the characteristic of protraction is in line, as 
developed by Zartman. He posits that a conflict is not really intractable until it has gone on for a 
while and resisted attempts to render it tractable. This is reminiscent of the scenario in Kashmir 
and attempts from New Delhi and Islamabad. “The importance of protraction, however, lies not 
in its numerical duration but in that duration’s effect.”  Duration paves the path for incremental 23
hurdles which add to the problems of making such conflicts tractable. Conflicts are “ingrained 
into the history and mythology of the parties, an ideological explanation for national efforts and 
problems, and so parties become reliant on them and are loath to part with them.”  This is 24
reminiscent of the state of affairs between India and Pakistan, in light of domestic public opinion, 
political opposition, and (manipulable) public outcry.  
 Mandel, R, and Clarke, S. (1982). Intractability and International Bargaining 21
 Zartman, I.W. (2005). p.48.22
 Ibid.23
 Rosoux, V. (2000). Les usages de Ia memoire dans les relations internationals. Brussels: Bruylant. 24
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They become institutionalized by the parties as subjects of perverse routines for carrying out the 
conflict economically, stretching from alliances and resolutions to hotlines and border regimes.  25
Meerts asserts “they become the subjects of sunken costs, the vehicles of entrapment, which 
blind the parties to possible cooperation and solution.”  As a result, parties become insulated 26
against the perception of stalemate and the costs attached to it. Instead, the conflicting parties 
look for opportunities to escalate the conflict to possible unilateral advantage (transitive 
escalation), and at the same time become vulnerable to internal and external dynamics of the 
conflict to escalate on its own (intransitive escalation).   27
1.2.4. Conceptualizing conflict resolution and transformation 
Just as regional integration has several overlapping and cognate activities mentioned earlier, so 
does conflict resolution. These are transformation, management, settlement, containment, 
regulation, and so on.  Hence, for the sake of clarity and precision, it is useful to state at the 28
outset that this study is concerned primarily with two of these overlapping terms, i.e. resolution, 
and transformation. It is theorized that the first major step or goal is resolution (considering other 
activities have proved to be largely fruitless), which will pave the way for regional integration in 
South-Asia, and SAARC will prove to set the centre-stage for regional cooperation. 
Transformation of the conflict in Kashmir, on the other hand, would lead to regional 
 Kriesberg, L. (2005). Nature, Dynamics and Phases of Intractability, pp. 65-98.25
 Meerts, P. (2004). Entrapment and Escalation26
 See for instance, Smoke, R. (1977). War.;  Zartman, I. W. (2004). The Dynamics of Escalation.27
 For definitions of these  terms, see Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1999). pp.30-32. 28
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transformation, whereby South-Asia will act as a single political entity with relatively smooth 
decision-making, consensus, and cooperation in issues of mutual concern.  
Conflict resolution can be perceived as a top-down approach in the eclectic framework of this 
study, and transformation as a bottom-up approach. The former pertains to elite decision making 
and consensus, and the latter requires socialization process pertaining people (such as education, 
people to people contact, exchange of ideas, etc).  
Defining these two concepts are now in order. Conflict resolution is a comprehensive term, 
which implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are adequately addressed, i.e cessation of 
violent behavior, hostile attitudes, and a change in the structure of the conflict.  “Conflict 29
transformation is a significant step beyond conflict resolution, which represents its deepest level. 
It implies a deep transformation in the institutions and discourses that reproduce violence, as 
well as in the conflict parties themselves and their relationships. It corresponds to the underlying 
tasks of structural and cultural peace-building.”  It must be noted that transformation cannot be 30
ascertained, or achieved, and neither is the objective of this study. It is a phenomena that can 
only occur naturally with the passage of time and practice. Furthermore, conflict resolution can 
be perceived as a top-down (elite and state driven) process, whereas transformation as a bottom-
up (wider public and civil society driven) process. Studies indicate both top-down and bottom-up 
approaches are necessary for conflict resolution and eventual transformation.  31
 Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1999). pp.3-32.29
 Ibid. 30
 Lederach, J. P. (1995). Preparing for peace: Conflict transformation across cultures. Syracuse University Press.; 31
Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1999). Contemporary Conflict Resolution. Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press.; Ury, W. L. (2000). The third side: Why we fight and how we can stop, New York: Penguin books pp.4-17.; 
Ury, W. L. (1987). Strengthening international mediation. Negotiation Journal, 3(3), pp.225-229.; 
!19
1.2.5. Conceptualizing international mediation  
Prominent scholars of the field describe mediation as a “mode of negotiation in which a third 
party helps the conflicting parties find a solution that they cannot find by themselves.”  When 32
two conflicting parties are dealing with each other’s actions and issues, it is not difficult to 
imagine a spiral of (mutual) hostility between them. Therefore, it is widely believed that the 
entry of a third party may change the conflict structure and allow a different pattern of 
communication, enabling the third party to filter or reflect back the messages, attitudes and 
behavior of the disputants.  Additionally, depending on the resources of the mediator, the 33
conflicting parties may also be induced by being presented with attractive inducements 
(economic aid, FDI, tariff reduction, among others), which is more attractive than continuing the 
conflict. Mediation essentially involves the voluntary intervention of one or more third parties, 
depending on the specific context. It is a voluntary process in which the parties retain control 
over the outcome, although it is often combined with positive and negative inducements 
(mediation with muscle via carrots and sticks).  This study will further elaborate on mediation 34
in the designated section.  
1.2.6. Conceptualizing cooperation  
Cooperation can be characterized as “a situation where parties agree to work together to produce 
new gains for each of the participants that would be unavailable to them by unilateral action, at 
 Touval, S. and Zartman, I. W. (2006). p-428.32
 Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. and Woodhouse, T. (1999). p-21.33
 See for instance Vuković, S. (2012). pp.265-293.34
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some cost.”  Cooperation is thus fundamental not only for the functioning of regional 35
organizations as mediators, but also for a coalition of third parties to mediate the Kashmir 
conflict in an effective manner. “It implies a dynamic through which parties with competing 
interests decide to pool their resources and capabilities in order to attain common gains. 
Cooperation is not coincidental, as it represents a conscious and planned course of action through 
which participants reach an agreement to overcome their incompatibility by working together.”  36
One explanation of why cooperation takes place is the existence of interdependence.  From the 37
perspective of negotiation, “cooperation is a process in which participating actors combine 
competing interests to obtain common ones.”  By exchanging the necessary information about 38
interests and needs, conflicting parties redefine their incompatibilities by seeking to create joint 
gains.   39
Scholars posit establishing joint gains requires abandonment of maximalist goals, along with 
formulation of solutions which are based on mutually beneficial compromise.  Furthermore, the 40
element of reciprocity is also integral to the process, as the creation of joint gains through 
cooperation is only possible if parties are willing to reciprocate. Reciprocity is essentially an 
assurance that cooperative behavior will be rewarded with a similar behavior in the future.  41
 Zartman, I. W. and Touval, S. (2010). International cooperation, p1.35
 Vuković, S. (2015).  p.46.36
 Keohane, R,. and Nye, J. S. (1977). Power and Interdependence, pp. 132-134.37
 Hopmann, P. T. (2010).  pp.95-110.38
 Vuković, S. (2015). p.47.39
 Hopmann, P. T. (2001). p.219.40
 Vuković, S. (2015) p-47.41
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“Parties reciprocate cooperation not so much because they expect an immediate reward but 
because they have a relationship built upon trust in which they can expect the other to reciprocate 
whenever necessary at any indefinite time in the future.”  One of the forthcoming sections of 42
this study pertaining multiparty mediation will elaborate a bit more on cooperation. 
1.2.7. Conceptualizing the notion of success 
The final element that needs to be addressed is the notion of success, which is challenging to 
conceptualize or define, as the evidence of success or failure is rather vague. Additionally, as 
Bercovitch described “what appears successful to one person may be seen as unsuccessful by 
others. Mediation may seem successful at one time only to be seen as totally unsuccessful 
months or years later.”  Such reasoning can also be applied to the Kashmir conflict and 43
mediation effects on India and Pakistan. In the past, ceasefire agreements, removal of armed 
personnel, observation, and investigation lasted initially, no matter the duration, thus being 
successful in these accounts. The aversion of another war in 1999 and continuation of official 
dialogue can be perceived as additional successes.  Nevertheless, the conflict, and the region 44
demands renewed mediation efforts towards a positive peace. Hence, success is theorized to be 
grounded on attaining a positive peace, and regional integration in South-Asia. Additionally, 
success would also be pertinent to satisfying the core needs and interests of all parties concerned, 
i.e. the Kashmiri people, New Delhi, and Islamabad. 
 Hopmann, P. T. (2010). pp. 103-104.42
 Bercovitch, J. (2007), p.31.43
 The current author has addressed these points for a term paper for the course: conflict, civil wars and mediation.44
!22
1.3. Literature Review  
As the primary objective of this study is to illustrate the prerequisites of regional integration in 
South-Asia, it is vital to investigate the prospects of international mediation in resolving the 
Kashmir conflict. Additional important elements are soft and smart power. This indicates that 
several schools of literature have played an instrumental part in this study. In other words, 
separate modes of IR literature are clubbed together for obtaining the goals of this study. For the 
sake of clarity, different schools or modes of literature will be addressed separately, with 
references to the commendable contributions out there.  
The integration, or rather transformation of Western Europe into a pluralistic security community 
of states via resolution of an intractable conflict between the two continental major powers has 
contributed to an upsurge in the systematic study of regions.  Consequently, studies have been 45
conducted for the efforts at community building in Southeast Asia.  A study on East Asia 46
indicates a distinctive set of regional institutions, which characterize a regional society of 
states.  Another study on the Middle East found sufficient differentiation from the global level 47
to see a distinct regional society, i.e. League of Arab States.  Comprehensive systematic studies 48
with a focus on South-Asia are abundant in the scholarly literature, but whats arguably lacking is 
a systematic multifaceted theoretical perspective which addresses the diverse regional dynamics.  
 T.V. Paul (2012). Regional Transformation in International Relations. pp.283-298.45
 Acharya, A. (2014). Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional 46
order.; Wei-Yen, D. H. (2007). Brick by brick: the building of an ASEAN economic community. 
 Buzan, B and Zhang, Y. (2009). International Society and East Asia: English School Theory at the Regional Level47
 Buzan, B and Gonzalez-Peláez, A. (2009).  International Society and the Middle East, pp.226-50.48
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As examining a region is advantageous, more information about regional processes is desirable. 
For instance, knowing whether regional peace-keeping machinery is more effective than UN 
procedures is important for conflict resolution purposes.  Moreover, the study of regional 49
integration allows a comparative study of foreign policies with domestic policies, and also to 
connect it with international processes.  50
The generalizability of the approaches used in previous studies is questionable. In all fairness, it 
is difficult to generalize approaches or findings from different regional contexts, which are 
fraught with subjective explanatory or deductive capacities; facts, issues, and interpretations. The 
unique characteristic of the approach utilized in this study lies in the multi-paradigmatic or 
eclectic account, which could serve as a theoretical umbrella to study other regions, with tailor-
made region specific dynamics. Hence, it makes such an approach replicable in other regional 
contexts without much challenges. Additionally, modifications can be made according to 
subjective regional dynamics. 
Within the realm of IR, different scholars use divergent theories, integrationist or otherwise, and 
some are even antithetical. For Europe, scholars theorize the legitimacy of supra-national 
organizations via integrationist theories focusing on cooperation and integration. Scholars seem 
to have exhausted neo-functionalism as a theoretical framework, led by this theory’s explanatory 
might in examining Western Europe, only to find the lack of complementarity in other regional 
contexts.  Ernst Haas posits this theory’s applicability in the developing or third world as 51
 Haas, E. (1970). pp.607-646.49
 Ibid.50
 Ibid.51
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unsuitable. Nevertheless, if cooperation in any one sector or issue area leads to cooperation in 
another, this theory passes its test in applicability. The inter-governmentalist approach of Stanley 
Hoffman is relevant in the context of South-Asia, which regards national governments of states 
as a significant factor related to regional integration.  
As noted earlier, the surge in regional integration studies is a significant development in 
international relations. It can be argued that every country today is now virtually a member of at 
least one regional institution. The existing literature contains several remarkable studies which 
examine the regional scenario in South-Asia.  These comprehensive studies comparatively 52
utilize theories of trade, security, great-power influence, and domestic political theories to 
examine South-Asia. Nevertheless, there is little research on a comprehensive account that 
contains external as well as internal factors in a regional context. It should also be noted that 
regional subgroups (such as BBIN, BCIM, BIMSTEC), will not be touched upon, and instead 
SAARC would be focused upon, which encompasses all regional members in one institution.  
Detailed studies have attempted to analyze South Asia vis-a-vis SAARC, presenting insights of 
its impact on regional integration, or lack thereof.  Additional accounts are also available, which 53
address trade and economic aspects of regional integration. One study evaluates SAARC beyond 
 See,  Dossani, R., Sneider, D. and Sood, V. (2010). Does South Asia exist?. Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein 52
Asia-Pacific Research Center.;  Francois, J., Rana, P. and Wignaraja, G. (2009). National Strategies for Regional 
Integration: South and East Asian Case Studies. London, UK: Anthem Press.;  Razzaque, M. and Basnett, Y. 
(eds.) (2014). Regional Integration in South Asia: Trends, Challenges and Prospects, Commonwealth Secretariat, 
London.; Ganguly, S. (2006). South Asia. New York: New York University Press.; Chari, P., Cheema, P. and Cohen, 
S. (2003). Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990. London: Routledge 
Curzon.;  Kumaraswamy, P. and Copland, I. (2009). South Asia: The Spectre of Terrorism. New Delhi: Routledge.; 
Hagerty, D. (2005). South Asia in World Politics. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.; Shastri, A. and 
Wilson, A. (2013). The Post-Colonial States of South Asia: Political and Constitutional Problems. Hoboken: Taylor 
and Francis.
 See for instance: Dash, K. (2008). Regionalism in South Asia: negotiating cooperation, institutional structures. 53
London: Routledge;  Saez, L. (2012). The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) : An 
emerging collaboration architecture. Hoboken: Taylor & Francis. 
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economic integration to present a detailed appraisal of cooperation in environmental security, 
human welfare, and cooperation in security matters.  Another volume examines human 54
development and well-being, and reveals in light of the current trajectory, the alarming impact on 
the region, as well as the wider international community.  All of these aforementioned studies 55
consistently argue that any progress towards regional integration in South-Asia hinges on the 
cooperation between India and Pakistan.  
Furthermore, several noteworthy studies address aptly, the intractable conflict between India and 
Pakistan over Kashmir.  For instance, Sumit Ganguly analyzes the dynamics of the region since 56
the advent of partition of the subcontinent.  In another study, he demonstrates the erosion of 57
singular claims of both India and Pakistan. In case of the former, the erosion of secularity and 
rigging of elections in the 1980s; for the latter, the atrocities, plight, and eventual break-up of 
East from West Pakistan meant that sympathy towards Kashmir was not based solely on 
religion.  Additional important matters have also been examined in previous studies, namely, the 58
 Ahmed, Z. (2013). Regionalism and Regional Security in South Asia: The Role of SAARC. Ashgate Publishing, 54
Ltd.
 Najam, A. and Yusuf, M. (2013). South Asia 2060 : Envisioning Regional Futures. London: Anthem Press.55
 See for instance, Ganguly, S. (2016). Deadly impasse: Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century. 56
S.l.: Cambridge University Press.; Cohen, S. (2013). Shooting for a Century: The India-Pakistan Conundrum. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.; Ganguly, S. and Thompson, W. (2011). Asian Rivalries: Conflict, 
Escalation, and Limitations on Two-level Games. Stanford, California.: Stanford Security Series.;  Schofield, V. 
(2003). Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. London: I.B. Tauris.; Chari, P., Cheema, P. and 
Cohen, S. (2003). Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis of 1990. London: 
Routledge Curzon.; Hakeem, A. (2014). Paradise on Fire: Syed Ali Geelani and the Struggle for Freedom in 
Kashmir. Kube Publishers.; Davis, Z. (2011). The India-Pakistan Military Standoff: Crisis and Escalation in South 
Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
 Ganguly, S. (2013). Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947. New York: Columbia University 57
Press. 
 Ganguly, S. (2004). The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect. Routledge. London: Frank Cass. See also, 58
Widmalm, S. (2014). Kashmir in Comparative Perspective: Democracy and Violent Separatism in India. London: 
Routledge/Curzon. 
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evolution of American policy,  the dangers of nuclear escalation,  and the insurgency scenario 59 60
in the disputed lands.   61
The approach of this study owes to the fact that previous analyses and proposals have neither 
accentuated greater regional integration, nor resolution of the conflict in Kashmir. Previous 
contributions have focused too much on the causes, persistence, and other details about the 
conflict itself, without a realistic and applicable proposal for resolution on a equitable basis. This 
study aspires to fill this gap by presenting a fresh outlook, along with a proposal which might 
change the trajectory of regional integration in South-Asia. Additionally, as soft and smart power 
have an instrumental role as prerequisites, insights will be inferred and borrowed from Joseph 
Nye Jr, the progenitor of these concepts. In terms of mediation and conflict management 
literature, prominent scholars footnoted accordingly will be relied upon.  
Lessons learnt from Europe, North America, and Southeast Asia (to an extent) indicate that either 
cooperation between two powerhouse states in a region, or the legitimate leadership of one can 
be the best guarantor of regional stability and integration. Hence the devotion of particular 
 Riedel, B. (2013). Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back. Washington, D.C.: 59
Brookings Institution Press.;  Ganguly, S. and Fair, C. (2008). Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency 
Operations in Sacred Spaces. New York: Oxford University Press.;  Chari, P., Cheema, P. and Cohen, S. (2007). 
Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press.
 Ganguly, S. and Kapur, S. (2010). India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia. New 60
York: Columbia University Press.;  Ganguly, S. and Hagerty, D. (2005). Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in 
the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons. Seattle: University of Washington Press.;  Khan, S. (2009). Nuclear Weapons and 
Conflict Transformation: The Case of India-Pakistan. London: Routledge.; Hagerty, D. (1998). The Consequences 
of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia. Cambridge, Massachusetts.: MIT Press.; Wirsing, R. (2003). 
Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe
 Ganguly, S. and Fidler, D. (2009). India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned. London: Routledge. 61
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attention to India elucidates the extent of its impact on regional integration in South-Asia.  62
Studies also reveal India’s pursuance of predominantly hegemonic strategies, which inhibit New 
Delhi to generate a perspective of genuine leadership among regional neighbors.  Similarly, 63
studies also demonstrate Pakistan’s troubled history of jihadi militancy and terrorism, military 
coups, dictators, insurgences, and harboring terrorists such as Osama bin Laden, which inhibit 
the generation of genuine trust from observers in Washington to New Delhi.  64
Much information is also available about Kashmir, its history, and also the current situation. 
Scholarly accounts are also redolent of the justifications of India and Pakistan, and which of 
these states should Kashmir be a part of.   65
The elements of regional integration, Kashmir conflict and its resolution, smart power, and 
international multiparty mediation exist as components of the eclectic approach. This study 
merges these elements in investigating regional integration in South-Asia. In other words, these 
elements within the realm of IR are merged to find a diplomatic solution to the Kashmir conflict, 
which is in turn believed to accentuate regional integration in South-Asia. 
 Mazumdar, A. (2015). Indian Foreign Policy in Transition: Relations with South Asia. Abingdon, Oxon: 62
Routledge, Taylor and Francis.;  Michael, A. (2013). India's Foreign Policy and Regional Multilateralism. 
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.;  Siddiqui, A. (2007). India and South Asia: Economic 
Developments in the Age of Globalization. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 
 Destradi, S. (2012). Indian Foreign and Security Policy in South Asia: Regional Power Strategies. Milton Park, 63
Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.; see also, Ogden, C. (2014). Indian Foreign Policy. Cambridge: John Wiley and Sons.
 For  a  detailed  account,  see  Fair,  C.  and  Watson,  S.  (2015).  Pakistan's  Enduring  Challenges.  Philadelphia: 64
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 See for instance, Ganguly, S. (2004). The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect. Routledge. London: Frank 65
Cass.; Cohen, S. (2004). The idea of Pakistan. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.; Mohan, C. Raja, 
Rizvi, H. A., Schaffer, H, and Kathwari, M. (2009). “How the Kashmir Dispute Affects Security in South Asia.” 
CFR.org. Council on Foreign Relations website. 
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1.4. A multi-paradigmatic or eclectic framework  
This thesis project aims to investigate the prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia. 
Essentially, it is an investigation of the impact of a protracted conflict on regional integration, 
and its resolution (through mediation) on the regions future trajectory. As indicated in the 
introduction, a multi-paradigmatic approach will be adopted to guide the theoretical framework 
of this study, in which variables linked with different IR theories will be utilized. It could be 
regarded as a typological theory of sorts. Such a framework will be supplementary in considering 
a broader spectrum of alternative explanations by wielding a much wider theoretical reach.   66
Furthermore, analytical eclecticism as a strategy for theoretical innovation is based on the 
grounds that “the complex links between power, interests, and norms defy analytical capture by 
any one paradigm.”  Consequently, proponents of an eclectic approach postulate that more 67
variables should be considered for analyzing empirical puzzles, rather than striving for a 
“parsimonious and often incomplete explanations.”  Analytic eclecticism is defined as 68
comprising “an intellectual stance that supports efforts to complement, engage, and selectively 
utilize theoretical constructs embedded in contending research traditions to build complex 
arguments that bear on substantive problems of interest to both scholars and practitioners.”   69
The study of regional integration in South-Asia, or any other region in the world for that matter, 
is rather diverse theoretically in today’s time, owing to the variety of forces at play. Hence it 
would be unwise to ignore the mainstream modes of IR thought. Therefore, Norrin Ripsman’s 
 Paul, T. V. (2012). pp. 3-22.66
 Katzenstein, P. and Okawara, N. (2002). pp.153-185.67
 Hlatky, S. V. (2012). pp.283-298.68
 Sil, R. and Katzenstein, P. (2010). Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics, pp.411-431.69
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eclectic or multi-paradigmatic account will be employed, in which he combines different IR 
theories and provides an analysis of regional transformation.  Essentially, this transitional 70
approach relies on realist and statist mechanisms in the first stage, and liberal, constructivist, and 
societal mechanisms in the second stage as part of a comprehensive account.  This will 71
supplement the identification of theoretical prescriptions for ending protracted conflict in South-
Asia, i.e. Kashmir. The aforementioned stages are based on bottom-up theories (liberal and 
constructivist) on one hand, and top-down theories (realist and statist) on the other hand. 
“Bottom-up approaches to peacemaking seek to make the societies of the belligerent states the 
engine of conflict resolution, in the conviction that they can rein in their governments and 
restrain conflict if they so desire.”  In contrast, top-down approaches view the state, rather than 72
society, as the panacea for peacemaking.  73
Scholarly views on regional integration range largely on perceptions of the phenomena either as 
a terminal condition, or a process.  In accordance with Haas, this study evaluates integration as 74
a process for the creation of political communities defined in institutional and attitudinal terms. It 
 Ripsman, N. (2005). pp. 669-693. For other similar accounts see Sheehan, J. (2008). Where have all the soldiers 70
gone?  The  Transformation  of  Modern  Europe.  Boston:  Houghton  Mifflin;  Katzenstein,  P.  (2005).  A World  of 
Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium.  Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press; Miller, B. (2007). 
States, nations, and the great powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
 Hall,  J.  and Paul,  T.  V.  (1999).pp.  67-77.  Sil,  R.  and Katzenstein,  P.  (2010).  Beyond Paradigms: Analytical 71
Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics.
 Ripsman, N. (2012). Top-down peacemaking: why peace begins with states and not societies. In: T. V. Paul, ed., 72
International Relations Theory and Regional Transformation, New York: Cambridge University Press, p-258. 
 Ibid, pp.260-262.73
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will rely on Haas’s seminal work on the study of regional integration, and briefly look at one of 
the three schools of pre-theorizing prescribed in that study, i.e. Neo-Functionalism.  Haas 75
asserts neo-functional theorizing as “consistently contingent and phenomenological, which 
consequently avoids normative assertion and systemic generalization.”  Additionally, one 76
limitation which inhibits generalization is embedded in the very source of the approach, i.e. the 
modern pluralistic-industrial democratic polity, which hinders application in South-Asia. This 
presents a rationale for studying integration in Western Europe,  but application to the 77
developing world in general presents further systematic difficulties. Nevertheless, this approach 
does prefer observation of bargaining styles, strategies, and organizational growth or decay as 
basic data, which is crucial for this study. Thus, only certain elements of the neo-functionalist 
approach will be incorporated in the eclectic framework, i.e. the collective cooperation in certain 
areas of mutual concern which will yield tangible benefits, and subsequent cooperation in other 
areas of mutual concern. 
In terms of regional integration theories, Stanley Hoffman’s intergovernmentalist approach will 
also be adopted in the eclectic theoretical toolkit, which essentially treats states as the primary 
actors in the integration process. This theory’s predictions in the process of integration in South-
 Haas, E. (1970). The Study of Regional Integration. pp.607-646.75
 Ibid, pp. 627-628.76
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Asia is apposite because of the importance of government initiatives for conflict resolution, as 
well as regional integration. As Uwe Puetter argues, “the strength of this theory lies in the 
appropriateness and legitimacy of policy decisions which are derived from a reasoned consensus 
and open discourse through negotiated policy coordination, and we can trace the competing 
logics of interaction.”  It highlights how policy adjustments are deliberate through the process 78
of ‘coordinated negotiation.’ Nevertheless, this theory is limited by it exclusive focus on 
ministers and heads of states, or governments with regard to economic, security and foreign 
policy.  79
The liberal viewpoints of this study is focused on the conditions that lead to a peaceful regional 
order via the three mechanisms of democracy, economic interdependence, and institutions.  80
Additionally, liberal institutionalism as an alternative to neorealist mode of thought rejects the 
latter’s assumptions of international politics as a struggle for state power as top priority and 
prescribes “actors other than states participate directly in global politics, in which a clear 
hierarchy of issues do not exist, and force is an ineffective instrument of policy.”  Liberal 81
institutionalism places emphasis on global governance and international organizations to 
prescribe IR thought. Nonetheless, the shortcomings of this mode of thought is also prevalent in 
South-Asia due to the inability of international as well as regional organizations, i.e. U.N and 
SAARC to stimulate integration. As the UN did not succeed in finding a lasting solution since 
the first war after independence to ensure positive peace and maintenance of a ceasefire, the 
 Puetter, Uwe. (2012). Europe's deliberative intergovernmentalism, p-164. 78
 Ibid.79
 Russett, B., Oneal, J. and Davis, D. (1998). pp.441-467; Oneal, J. and Russett, B. (1999). pp.423-442.80
 Keohane, R and Nye, J (1977). Power and Interdependence, p-24.81
!32
shortcomings of the international organization is salient. Lack of the SAARC’s ability to promote 
integration, or cooperation between India and Pakistan illustrates the fragility of a regional 
organization. Theoretical output indicates effective functioning of SAARC is contingent upon the 
cooperation between India and Pakistan, and resolution of Kashmir. But it might very well be the 
case that for India and Pakistan to cooperate, and resolve Kashmir, SAARC should present itself 
as a more attractive option than continuance of conflict.  
In a nutshell, neorealist dynamics in the region are also prevalent, largely characteristic of the 
devotion on state power by India and Pakistan. This is manifested by the conventional and 
nuclear arms race, in addition to the alliances with external parties. Despite the lucid asymmetry 
between the belligerents, three full scale wars, countless skirmishes and ceasefire violations 
illustrate the shortcomings of neorealist theorization of the regional dynamics. Since partition of 
the subcontinent, bilateral relations of India and Pakistan are fraught with realist inferences from 
IR theory. The enduring and intractable conflict in Kashmir has had wide ranging implications on 
regional integration. Rivalry between the powerful states in the region has inhibited domestic as 
well as region-wide growth and development. Although mediation so far has achieved a negative 
peace in Galtung’s term, the manifestation of a positive peace is pivotal for a lasting solution.  
This very notion of a positive peace could provide the balance and momentum required for 
regional stability and integration. The current trajectory in the South-Asian region makes salient 
that development and growth will continue to be impeded in the absence of political (top-down), 
and social (bottom-up) settlements. In light of a detailed analysis of the past and present 
trajectories of South-Asia, this study illustrates that major power rivalry within a region hinders 
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regional integration. This in turn might also have spillover effects on neighboring regions, 
thereby projecting a threat on international peace and security.  
This study also investigates the conflict in Kashmir, and examines the prospects of international 
mediation towards its resolution. Conflict resolution as a defined specialist field came of age in 
the post-Cold War era. It is a noteworthy point, as external involvement in Kashmir was 
mitigated by the Shimla Agreement in 1972. Therefore, it can be inferred, with the advancements 
and dynamism within the field, future initiatives at mediation would (need to) be comprehensive, 
to say the least. It is believed, with the right ‘package deal’ for resolution, presented through an 
apposite negotiation strategy, with mutually enticing opportunities would persuade New Delhi 
and Pakistan to resolve Kashmir.  
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1.5. Independent variables and hypotheses 
This section essentially presents the relevant independent variables which will be used to 
correlate the prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia. 
The first independent variable is the official position of the Indian and Pakistani governments 
regarding resolution of the Kashmir conflict. Examining the relevant official documents, leaders’ 
perspectives, and narrative operationalizes the variable. In lieu of the partition of the 
subcontinent, the accession of Kashmir to India in the backdrop of militant insurgency from 
Pakistan was not final, as summed up by Nehru’s statement:  
“We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That 
pledge we have given (and the Maharaja has supported it) not only to the people of Kashmir 
but to the world. We will not and cannot back out of it. We are prepared, when peace and 
order have been established, to have a referendum held under international auspices like the 
U.N. We want it to be a fair and just reference to the people and we shall accept their 
verdict.”  82
Furthermore, one significantly relevant document is the 1972 Shimla agreement. This document 
entails that India and Pakistan are to bilaterally resolve all of their conflicts, including Kashmir. 
Additionally, neither is to take unilateral action regarding Kashmir despite respective mutual 
differences and legal interpretations. In other words, according to this document, both India and 
Pakistan have agreed to bilaterally resolve the Kashmir conflict, thus deeming bilateral efforts as 
 Nehru’s official telegram. Primin 304, Dated 8th November 1947.  82
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their official position.  Nevertheless, India’s official position regarding the referendum or 83
plebiscite has been controversial, as the 1980s witnessed Indian hegemony, rigging of elections, 
and human rights violations by the army in Kashmir. Thus, it could be argued that this official 
position is subject to change or influence from more beneficial options, offered by the apposite 
coalition of international mediators. It is vital for this independent variable to be addressed at the 
outset, and will be kept under consideration during the entire course of this study. This variable 
will not be addressed in more detail in forthcoming sections.  
The second independent variable is the position of the Indian and Pakistani governments 
towards international mediation of the Kashmir conflict. A minimal record of third party 
intervention in Kashmir is owing to India’s aversion to outside interference.  New Delhi 84
consistently deems it a bilateral issue, as stated in the aforementioned Simla agreement of 1972, 
which mitigated the role of the UN. Conventional wisdom proclaims that domestic public 
opinion, prevalent in domestic constituencies of both India and Pakistan, inhibits a liberal 
perspective from decision-makers. It is also believed for this very reason, mediation could 
provide political cover when decision makers face high domestic audience costs for unpopular, 
although potentially prudent concessions.  Contrastingly, Islamabad is open to, and indeed 85
welcomes international mediation in Kashmir.  
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The third independent variable is endogenous or domestic factors, in order to elucidate the 
domestic public opinion of India and Pakistan toward Kashmir, and towards one another. This 
study will engage a little deeper and also try to illustrate the causes behind indoctrinated public 
opinion towards Kashmir, as well as regional integration. This variable will be operationalized 
by utilizing relevant indicators such as: role of elites, human development index (HDI), literacy 
rate, domestic public opinion, socialization process, and religion and identity. The respective 
operationalizations of these indicators will be determined in the case study of which they are a 
part of. 
The fourth independent variable is the exogenous or external factors, which elucidates the 
impact of external countries of mutual concern and relevance to both India and Pakistan. This 
variable is operationalized by examining in detail, the impact or influence of the U.S., China, and 
Saudi Arabia on India and Pakistan. This will highlight the dynamics of bilateral relations with 
these external states, and also justify their potential mediatory capacities.  
The fifth independent variable is the regional dynamics of South-Asia, which will be 
operationalized by examining the diplomatic relations of the constituent member states of the 
region. The bilateral relations in light of India and Pakistan’s rivalry over Kashmir, as well as 
individual bilateral relations will present fundamental insights for regional integration. 
Additionally, examining bilateral relations will also illustrate prospective mediation capacities of 
states within the region. This will in turn elucidate the mediatory capacity of SAARC, and 
members who have a potential role within SAARC as mediators of the Kashmir conflict.  
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The sixth independent variable is institutional dynamics and insights for SAARC. It will be 
operationalized by a case study which will compare two relatively successful regional 
organizations, one in the developed world, and the other in the developing world, i.e. EU and 
ASEAN. This will in turn present insights pertaining institutional capacity of SAARC, and 
potential areas of attention, as well as acumen for strengthening the institution for it to act as a 
meditator and manager of regional conflicts.  
The seventh independent variable is the future of power in South-Asia, i.e. soft and smart 
power, which is believed to be necessary components of the future trajectory of the region. These 
will be operationalized by definition and conceptualization, in addition to specific strategies for 
power conversion as part of top-down and bottom-up approaches mentioned in the theoretical 
framework. An entire chapter is dedicated to this crucial independent variable, which is believed 
to be a fundamental prerequisite of regional integration in South-Asia.  
The eight and final independent variable is prospects of international mediation, which will be 
operationalized on the basis of: a) the need for mediation to resolve the conflict in Kashmir; b) 
the kind and context of mediation, including the apposite number of mediators; c) adversarial 
relationship of the conflicting parties, which hinders bilateral initiatives at resolution; d) 
strategies, power, and bias within mediation; and e) the mediatory capacity of a regional 
organization, i.e. SAARC. These five heuristically created variables will help determine the 
prospects of international mediation. 
Substantiating the theoretical framework, the hypotheses for the research question of this study 
pertaining prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia, and its current predicament so far 
in light of the Kashmir conflict are as follows:  
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Null hypothesis: Reconciliation between the regional powers leads to regional integration. 
Alternate hypothesis 1: Regional integration leads to reconciliation between regional powers.  
Null Hypothesis: Reconciliation between New Delhi and Islamabad will lead to abatement of 
structural violence, and manifestation of positive peace. 
Alternate Hypothesis 2: Resolution of the Kashmir conflict will contribute towards abatement of 
structural violence, and manifestation of structural peace (and regional integration). This in turn 
will lead to incremental cooperation on regional matters of mutual concern, including conflict 
management in South-Asia (most notably, in Afghanistan). 
Null Hypothesis: Apposite initiatives by New Delhi and Islamabad will lead to effective 
mediation in the Kashmir conflict.  
Alternate Hypothesis 3: Effective mediation of the Kashmir conflict will lead to reconciliation 
between India and Pakistan, which in turn would lead to regional integration in South-Asia. 
Null hypothesis: As long as South-Asia is not deeply integrated, the SAARC cannot be expected 
to be effective in regional conflict management. 
Alternate hypothesis 4: Regional integration in South-Asia will lead to reconciliation and 
cooperation, which in turn will enable SAARC to mediate in regional conflicts.  
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1.6. Method of analysis and data collection 
Method of analysis  
This study does not singularly rely on one specific research methodology. Instead, a few tools of 
qualitative methods will be utilized to address the research question of this study. Most of the 
empirical research of this study will rely on process tracing analysis, which identifies the key 
events, individuals, relationships and decisions that link causal conditions to outcomes.  Process 86
tracing is significant as it allows a demonstration of causal relationship between dependent and 
independent variables. Additionally, this technique also allows to make deductions from the 
theoretical framework. George and Bennett posit “process tracing attempts to identify the 
intervening causal process, the causal chain and causal mechanism between an independent 
variable and the outcome of the dependent variable.”  This will be useful to subsequently 87
investigate causal links between the rivalry amidst India and Pakistan and regional integration in 
South-Asia. The time frame ranges from the advent of partition of the subcontinent, to the 
present time. 
Another qualitative tool utilized is content analysis, which is applied throughout the study. 
Content analysis essentially refers to a family of techniques for studying the “mute evidence” of 
texts.  It is not very different from the methodology so far, and its sort of a formal name for the 88
technique to analyze documents and texts in general. Holsti groups fifteen uses of content 
 Bennett, A., & George, A. L. (2005); Bennett, A. (2008). 86
 Bennett, A., & George, A. L. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. p.206.87
 Hodder, I. (1994). The interpretation of documents and material culture. p. 155.88
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analysis into three basic categories: a) make inferences about the antecedents of a 
communication; b) describe and make inferences about characteristics of a communication; and 
c) make inferences about the effects of a communication.  This is therefore useful in the 89
analysis of various sorts of communication, including media sources. 
To address the prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia, a comparative case study of 
the regional powers India and Pakistan will be conducted, which will pursue the method of 
“structured, focused comparison.” According to the pioneers of this method, “the method is 
‘structured’ in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and 
that these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, 
thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The 
method is ‘focused’ in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined.”  90
Furthermore, this method is relevant to this study as it was devised in order to yield useful 
generic knowledge of important foreign policy problems.  As public opinion, and external 91
influence plays an important role in determining the foreign policy of India and Pakistan, this 
case study is expected to yield relevant information. 
This case study contains an analysis of (heuristically created mini variables) domestic factors 
such as: role of elites on decision making, human development index, literacy rate, domestic 
public opinion, socialization process, and religion and identity. All these independent variables 
will be applied across both cases, namely India and Pakistan. The case study also contains an 
 Holsti, Ole R. (1969). Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities.89
 Bennett, A., and George, A. L. (2005). p-67.90
 Ibid.91
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analysis of the impact or influence of external states on India and Pakistan. The objective of this 
case-study is to determine the external and internal factors that impact public opinion on policy 
making. To be clear, the class or subclass of events here is the impact of public opinion on policy 
making, and both external as well as internal factors will be analyzed for inductive and deductive 
reasoning. The broader goal of this case study is to determine the prerequisites of regional 
integration in South-Asia (the main dependent variable). By understanding the factors contingent 
upon public opinion, apposite strategies can be constructed to influence the same towards the 
benefits of regional integration. 
A second case study will be conducted using the same method of structured, focused comparison. 
The second case study concerns two example regional organizations, i.e. EU and ASEAN. The 
purpose of this case study is to draw insights for SAARC. By comparing the two successful 
examples of regional organizations, one from the developed and the other from the developing 
world, important insights can be gained that could help overcome the challenges faced in 
SAARC, and reinforce the institution as an effective mediator in regional conflicts. Case studies 
are preferred as they are useful for theory development across different schools of thought and 
they can incorporate both ‘material and ideational variables.’  Additionally, the method of case-92
studies aspire cumulative theoretical knowledge, which is useful in studying discourses, 
identities, and interactions systematically.  It compliments well with the eclectic or multi-93
paradigmatic framework of this study. Furthermore, one of the main advantages of case-studies 
 Bennett, A., & George, A. L. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. p.9.92
 Ibid.93
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is their ability to serve the heuristic purpose of inductively identifying additional variables and 
generating hypotheses.  94
Data collection  
This section will develop a model for data collection. Using process tracing and content analysis, 
the study will formally examine the scholarly literature, official documents, archives, statements, 
and also media sources in detail. The general knowledge acquired by the researcher throughout 
the research process of this study via “soaking and poking,” often leads to the construction of a 
chronological narrative that helps both the researcher and subsequent readers understand the 
basic outlines of the case.  Additionally, the method of structured, focused comparison 95
emphasizes discipline in the way one collects data, i.e. a systematic collection of the same 
information, and the same variables across the selected units of analysis. The procedure of 
systematic data compilation also entails that the questions asked of each case must be of a 
general nature, i.e. “they should not be couched in overly specific terms that are relevant to only 
one case but should be applicable to all cases within the class or subclass of events.”  In this 96
method, the investigator “defines and standardizes the data requirements of case studies by 
formulating theoretically relevant general questions to guide the examination of each case.”  In 97
 Eckstein, H. (1975). Case Studies and Theory in Political Science, pp.79-138.; George, A. L. (1979). Case Studies 94
and Theory Development pp.43-69.
 Bennett, A., & George, A. L. (2005). Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. p-89.95
 Bennett, A., & George, A. L. (2005).  p.86.96
 Ibid. p.41.97
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other words, general questions reflecting the research objective are asked of each case to guide 
and standardize data collection, which allows systematic comparison.  
Data will be collected largely from the existing scholarly literature, including books, documents, 
journal articles, essays, speeches, lectures, media sources, think-tanks, as well as some 
unpublished papers. Additionally, historical data will be recorded from primary and secondary 
sources, and official documents. Every piece of information gathered contributes to specific 
observable implications in the theoretical framework. Furthermore, observations will also be 
made on empirical data. With the data gathered and inferences generated through the 
aforementioned formal techniques, this study illustrates the regional integration scenario in 
South-Asia and determines the prerequisites for a stable regional order. Additionally, it aims to 
to reveal the prospects of international mediation on the resolution of the Kashmir conflict, and 
its consequent impact on regional integration. 
The quest for data collection in this study rests upon a lot of documents, which are referred to as 
written texts that highlight “evidence that in all its forms represent political, cultural, and social 
construction, and which cannot be subjected to an interview or focus group.”  Furthermore, this 98
evidence, “unlike the spoken word, endures physically and thus cannot be separated across space 
and time from its author, producer, or user.”   99
 Onwuegbuzie, A., Leech, N. L., & Collins, K. M. T. (2010). Innovative data collection strategies in qualitative 98
research. pp.696-726.
 Hodder, I. (2005). The interpretation of documents and material culture. pp.703- 715.99
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2.  Prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia 
2.1. Resolution of the intractable conflict in Kashmir 
Brief historical background 
Although a considerable list is footnoted in the literature review, a brief outline of the important 
facts are in order here, in order to devise a lasting solution or positive peace through mediation. 
Partition of the subcontinent from British rule aggravated the differences between Hindus and 
Muslims, which turned into a bitter rivalry. As evidence suggests, Kashmir is claimed, or more 
appropriately contested vehemently by both India and Pakistan since partition in 1947. 
Regarding the accession to India by the Hindu ruler of Kashmir at the time Maharaja Hari Singh, 
some believe his reign to be unpopular.  This could be traced back to the fact that the region of 100
Kashmir was sold by the British to the Dogra rulers, who helped the former in their wars against 
the Afghans and Sikhs. It could also be due to unpopular reign and lack of traditional roots of the 
ruler, coupled with the advent of a new home for Muslims, the tribal offensive from Pakistan 
took place. Nevertheless, in exchange for military reinforcements from India to oust an invasion 
of Pathtun tribal raiders with tacit support from Pakistan, the ruler acceded to India. The reasons 
 See Khan, G. H. (1980). Freedom Movement in Kashmir: 1931-1940;  For a comprehensive account of the nature 100
of the Dogra rule and the movement against it, see Bazaz, P. N. (1954). The History of Struggle for Freedom in 
Kashmir;  Saraf, M. Y. (1977). Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Lahore, Ferozsons Ltd., Vol. I.; also see the text of 
Governor General Lord Mountbatten’s Letter Dated 27 October 1947 to the maharaja of Kashmir in response to his 
offer of accession to the Indian Union, in Lakhanpal, P. L. (1958). Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir 
Dispute, p. 56. 
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for this contestation are valid, and justified from the perspectives of New Delhi as well as 
Islamabad, which in turn accentuates the intractable nature of the conflict.  
The primary reason for Islamabad to bring this territory under its ambit is not just a matter of 
territory, but more importantly, of identity, and nationalism. Owing to the fact that Kashmir is a 
muslim majority state, and Pakistan was created as the home for muslims of the subcontinent, it 
was believed to be a part of this new state for muslims. The very idea of Pakistan was conceived 
of as Kashmir being a part of it, i.e. the K in Pakistan, stands for Kashmir. On the other side of 
the same coin, Kashmir was a not just a matter of territory for New Delhi, but of the secular 
Indian identity, and nationalism. Thus, in the most crucial aspects, India and Pakistan’s 
perspectives of Kashmir was, and still is essentially the same. One regards Kashmir as part of its 
muslim identity and nationalism, whereas the other regards it as a part of it secular identity and 
nationalism. Thus, Kashmir has been described as “a hardy perennial in the catalog of 
international disputes, often serving as a kind of metaphor for the broader problems that plague 
India and Pakistan.”   101
This conflict has led to violent engagement between India and Pakistan, and stands as a severe 
impediment to regional integration in South-Asia and human development of well over one and a 
half billion people. There is not going to be any development and growth in South-Asia unless a 
positive peace between the regional powers is ascertained. This conflict is the principal 
underlying root of hostility between India and Pakistan, which inhibits bilateral, as well as 
regional cooperation. In other words, for South-Asia to emerge from the developing world, the 
resolution of this conflict is fundamental.  
 Schaffer, H. B., & Schaffer, T. C. (2005). p-295.101
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Despite India’s secular commitment of Kashmir’s future to “be settled by a reference to its 
people,”  certain actions have contributed to erode a genuine claim, and has accentuated 102
popular mistrust. For instance, the special provision of Kashmir as prescribed in the Indian 
constitution was eroded,  and electoral rigging, non-functional democracy, and repression by 103
the Indian state reinforce the Kashmiri people’s claim for the right to self-determination.  104
Furthermore, UN Security Council resolutions also endorsed the will of the Kashmiri people as 
the final dispensation, which was to be determined via a plebiscite or referendum.  Since 105
1980s, the local residents of the Kashmir Valley have been involved in rebellion and violence 
against Indian occupancy with tacit support from Pakistan’s intelligence agencies and militant 
groups alike. In lieu of this, New Delhi and Islamabad have engaged in a vehement resource 
draining process pertaining procurement of conventional and nuclear arms. The fate of the major 
portions of Indian and Pakistani people living in poverty, in addition to the poor records of 
human development could be traced back to these actions. 
As indicated earlier, Kashmir pertains personal, structural, and cultural violence. Effective 
management of ethnic, separatist, and religious conflicts by civil and international authorities 
“presupposes an understanding of their nature, their causes, and the outcomes of past efforts at 
management.”  It is redolent in scholarly analyses that the conflict in Kashmir is one of the 106
 Wirsing, Robert. G. (1994). India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute, pp.54-56. 102
 Sheikh, M. A. (1965). “Kashmir, India and Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs. For the politics of the plebiscite, see also 103
Lockwood, D. E. (1969). pp. 382–96.
 Baba, N. A. (2012). Democracy and governance in Kashmir104
 For a list, see UN Resolutions on Kashmir. (1994). in Philosophy and Social Action, pp. 1–39. 105
 Gurr, T. R. (2007). Minorities, Nationalists and Islamists, pp.131-160.106
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most intractable conflicts of our time. The largely fruitless attempts at mediation so far, and the 
continuance of hostilities along the border, and polarization of one another by India and Pakistan 
have deemed this conflict as truly intractable. The conflict in Kashmir has typified the 
fundamental from of destructive conflicts, which implies a methodological employment of 
various forms of violence, ranging from physical to cultural and structural.  In accordance with 107
Galtung’s perspective, the Kashmir conflict has developed to a condition of negative peace, 
entailing cessation of direct violence. However, a positive peace yet remains to be achieved for a 
lasting settlement, which means overcoming structural and cultural violence as well.  
Resolution of the Kashmir conflict would mean the abatement of protracted hostility between the 
two key regional powers. As Kashmir is currently the overarching concern on matters both 
bilateral and region-wide,  its resolution will undoubtedly lead to genuine cooperation, and 108
consequent integration of the South-Asian region. Furthermore, resolution would lead to 
abatement of structural violence and manifestation of structural peace, or positive peace, which 
is currently lacking. As per the previously mentioned two-sides of the same coin example, 
resolution (analogous with peace) would mean absence of personal, as well as structural 
violence. In other words, resolution of the intractable conflict in Kashmir would evolve the 
currently manifest negative peace (absence of personal violence) into positive peace (absence of 
personal, and structural violence), by abating structural violence.  
 See Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. pp.167-191; Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural violence 107
pp.291-305.
 Among many others, see Jetly, R. (2003). pp.53-76;  Baba, N. A. (2014). Resolving Kashmir, pp.66-80.108
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2.2. Case study: India and Pakistan  
As the theoretical framework of this study indicates that regional integration is contingent upon 
cordial bilateral relations between the two regional powers, this case study will examine the 
internal dynamics of public opinion pertaining India and Pakistan, as well as the influence of 
external third parties on New Delhi and Islamabad. The endogenous or internal factors will help 
to determine the causes of indoctrinated domestic public opinion. As part of a bottom-up 
approach, this will be crucial in the construction of an adept strategy to impact domestic public 
opinion towards the benefits of integration. The exogenous or external factors will help 
determine the influence of external third parties on India and Pakistan. This is in the ambit of a 
top-down approach, and will also present insights pertaining potential mediating capacities. The 
findings from this case study will be supplementary in the broader goals of determining the 
prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia, as well as the prospects of international 
mediation on resolution of the Kashmir conflict. 
2.2.1. Endogenous or internal factors  
Role of elites: Elites play a crucial role in defining the narratives of nationalist and religious 
sentiment in India and Pakistan, especially due to the conflict in Kashmir. A lot of hindus and 
muslims alike have been killed in Kashmir, for which a large portion of domestic elites in India 
and Pakistan largely blame one another. John Zaller in a seminal book on public opinion argues 
that “elites play a central role in framing complex issues as shaping their presentation in mass 
media and public discourse.”  Additionally, although elite role is fundamental for advanced 109
 Zaller, J. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. p.92.109
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industrialized democracies, their role is even greater in developing countries with relatively low 
literacy rates. In developing countries, political elites as well as media elites can exercise greater 
control over information.  Elites (civilian, political, and military) on either side seem adamant 110
on blaming the other for misdeeds. Additionally, military and right-wing leaders and journalists 
promote antagonism towards the other. For instance, when the Pakistan based affiliate of the 
Islamic State claimed responsibility for a blast that killed around 40 people in May last year, the 
government was quick to blame India’s intelligence agency for the atrocity.  On the other hand, 111
Indian elites largely ignore the atrocities and breach of human rights of Kashmiris by the Indian 
military presence there. Records of rigged elections, suppression, and human rights violations are 
continually justified on the actions of violent non state acts of terrorism, and secessionist 
elements. Elite opinions are consistently shaped by mutual suspicion. For instance, diplomatic 
engagement was cancelled in 2014 due to perceived suspicion.  Although leaders such as Modi 112
and Sharif have the potential toward some sort of cooperation, such efforts are also inhibited by 
terrorist acts who aim to derail any peace process. For example, the terrorist attack on Pathankot, 
an Indian air field base in early 2016 impeded the ongoing bilateral diplomatic engagement 
between the two states. Nevertheless, multilateral events avail the opportunity for leaders to meet 
and discuss one another’s concerns.  113
 Kaltenthaler, K., and Miller, W. J. (2015). Partner or Enemy. p-232.110
 The World Post. (2015). “How Pakistan Hurts Its People By Blaming India,” May 15.111
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Human development index: The HDI is a noteworthy indicator of countries’ performances in 
areas of human development, such as life expectancy, education, and income per capita. 
Conducted by the UNDP, a country scores higher HDI when the life expectancy at birth is 
longer, the education period is longer, and the income per capita is higher.  It is also used to 114
characterize a particular country is developed, developing, or underdeveloped. The inherent 
human development approach is about “expanding the richness of human life, rather than simply 
the richness of the economy in which human beings live, and is thus is focused on people and 
their opportunities and choices.”   115
Ironically enough, HDI (a global index) will be operationalized as per the index which was 
developed by renowned economists Amartya Sen (Indian) and Mahbub ul Haq (Pakistani) in 
1990. As per the latest HDI estimates of 2015, India is ranked 130 in the world, and Pakistan is 
ranked 147.  The irony of HDI is salient in the context of India and Pakistan. The manifest 116
structural and cultural violence inhibits people in both countries from their true potential; and the 
deprivation of opportunities can be traced to the inherent structural violence. A strong case can 
be made that cooperation in terms of human development in South-Asia has the potential to 
buttress cooperation in other areas, such as poverty alleviation, literacy rate, etc. From a top-
down approach, cooperation between policymakers in India and Pakistan can produce spill-over 
effects into other areas of potential cooperation. 
 UNDP. (2015). About Human Development: What is human development? UNDP website. Accessed on May 7.114
 Ibid.115
 UNDP. (2015). International Human Development Indicators. Accessed on May 7.116
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Literacy rate: One of the primary indicators justifying the lack of will towards regional 
integration can be examined by the literacy rate or education level of the domestic population of 
a country. Studies demonstrate that the higher educated and professional layers of the population, 
of all ages, are consistently in favor of intensified integration.  Additionally, those most 117
satisfied with their standard of living also tend to be pro integration. In short, pro integration 
attitudes characterize the most successful and most “modern” segments of the population.  118
Therefore, examining these indicators in the context of India and Pakistan entails vital insights, 
as people need to be educated in order to understand the benefits of integration.  
Literacy rate will be operationalized as per the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) with 2015 
estimates based on people aged 15 or over who can read and write. The data is collated mostly by 
using surveys within the last ten years which are self-declared by the persons in question.  119
According to UIS 2015 estimates, literacy rate is 72.1 percent in India, and 58.7 percent in 
Pakistan. As per the same indicators, there is a remarkable difference between the literacy rate in 
India and Pakistan, from the global literacy at 86.3 percent, and for developed nations at 99.2 
percent.  Furthermore, the website of the World bank says that a larger share of the world’s 120
illiterate adults are found in South Asia. Therefore, it can be inferred that with an increase in 
literacy rate, and incremental education, public opinion might change in favor of regional 
integration. 
 Inglehart, R. (1967).  pp. 91-105.117
 Ibid.118
 UNESCO  Institute  for  Statistics.  (2015).  Data  is  collected  from  the  website  of  UIS.  Available  at.  http://119
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Domestic public opinion: This heuristic variable elucidates how the Indian and Pakistani people 
perceive one another, and is operationalized through opinion polls and surveys. Generally 
speaking, keeping aside Kashmir and the tainted political picture, the domestic populace of each 
country indeed seem very similar.  Despite conservative right-wing elements in both countries 121
who have strong reservations against the other, it should not be ignored that there are signs of 
mutual regard too. One Indian journalist’s account on her visit to Islamabad sums up the positive 
vibe of the ordinary people of Pakistan towards Indians.  Another account by an Indian 122
delegate of the South Asia peoples union at Pakistan further demonstrates the goodwill of 
Pakistani people, including members of parliament, cabinet ministers, supreme court lawyers, 
and so on.   123
It is noteworthy that opinions as recorded by polls may vary, essentially due to the occurrence of 
events that magnify the inherent antagonism. An opinion poll of the Indian and Pakistani publics 
reveals that half or more are open to a range of possible outcomes for Kashmir. Its analyst notes, 
“given the deep roots of the conflict over Kashmir, it is surprising that the conflict does not 
muster clearly polarized majorities in Pakistan and India, falling in line behind their 
governments’ positions. Instead, many show openness to considering different possibilities for 
resolving the conflict.”  Despite some positive glimmers of people to people perception, a 124
major portion of Indians and Pakistanis have largely negative views towards each other, 
 The Dawn. (2014). “6 surprises that greet a Pakistani in India,” October 7; The Dawn. (2014). “7 things that make 121
a Pakistani feel at home in India,” October 1. 
 The Dawn. (2015). “Pakistanis seem to love Indians. Do Indians feel the same way?”  March 31.122
 The Dawn. (2014). “Crossing borders: Why every Indian should visit Pakistan,” December 3.123
 World Public Opinion. (2008). Indian and Pakistani Publics Show Flexibility on Kashmir, July 16. Available at: 124
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especially after the 26/11 terror attack in Mumbai. According to a poll the year after, most 
Pakistanis viewed India as a big threat (although in some regions, Taliban and al-Qaeda were 
seen as bigger threats).  Many also deem importance to the resolution of the conflict in 125
Kashmir, which is seen as an obstacle to better relations, and nine out of every ten people think it 
is important for this to happen. Furthermore, majorities also seem to believe in good relations, 
and hence deem importance to improve relations between the two countries.  According to a 126
recent poll, although Indians seem wary about the threat emanating from Pakistan, a majority 
would like to see improved relations between the two countries, and encourage more trade and 
more talks.  These accounts paint a mixed and fluctuating picture of public perceptions towards 127
each other. Therefore, an appropriate political solution in Kashmir may offer the necessary 
momentum towards peace and a lasting solution. In sum, although opinions seem to fluctuate, 
the underlying fact is that Indians and Pakistanis are essentially very similar people, and a 
political solution can provide the impetus for better relations, as well as regional integration. 
Socialization process: Owing to the tainted political picture which is redolent of mistrust and 
suspicion, antagonism is systematically inculcated in the minds of young Indians and Pakistanis 
through school textbooks, jingoistic films and television shows, and ‘anti-other’ literature. 
Although the information revolution has changed a lot in the world, this breakthrough has not 
 Pew Research  Centre.  (2009).  “Pakistani  Public  Opinion:  Growing Concerns  about  Extremism,  Continuing 125
Discontent with U.S.”  August 13. Access: http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/08/13/chapter-5-relations-with-india/
 Ibid. 126
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occurred for most people in India and Pakistan due to indoctrination in the socialization process. 
For instance, a look at any middle school geography textbook in India and Pakistan will 
demonstrate the indigenous version of the map of Kashmir. Largely due to an indoctrinated 
socialization process, the formalized norm is to antagonize the other.  
This can be changed by combining a top-down and bottom-up approach this study indicates. 
Once the benefits of cooperation and integration are realized, specific policies can make amends 
in centralized middle and high school literature, news media, people to people interaction, ease 
on visa regulations, and so on. Via a bottom up approach, amends can be made via NGO 
initiatives, sport, entertainment, literary, film and TV shows, and so on. Furthermore, education 
can play a crucial role in connecting people and in changing perceptions. School and university 
exchanges are a potential panacea in this domain. Currently, most Indian and Pakistani students 
get acquainted to one another during their education in third countries. The potential of exchange 
programs and student to student connections is summed up in an op-ed by two students at 
Harvard from India and Pakistan.  Student exchanges also contribute tremendously towards the 128
soft power of the host nation. For example, the open for all university education in the US has a 
significant effect on its soft power. Despite the fierce competition between America and China, 
the doors to renowned American universities is open to all, including Chinese students, changing 
minds for the better (a crucial pillar of soft power).  129
 Bagaria, Renu. S,. and Akbar, Malik, S. (2014). “A dream of open borders,” and “Learning from each other” The 128
Times of India, December 31.
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Religion and identity related issues: This indicator is also relevant in the context of prerequisites 
of regional integration in SouthAsia, which will be operationalized by prevalent domestic 
conditions. Both India and Pakistan face major domestic challenges pertaining religious and 
communal issues. As per reports of the Home Ministry of India, an approximate 25 percent rise 
in religious and communal has been recorded in 2015. Additionally an increase in the number of 
incidents, as well as number of deaths resulting from these incidents have also been reported.  130
These incidents occur in a lot of states or provinces within India, and the central government 
blames the state (or provincial) governments for these incidents, and vice versa.  
Additionally, the USCIRF, a U.S. government body that monitors religious freedoms in different 
countries posits that India is on a negative trajectory in terms of religious freedom. As per its 
findings, “in 2015 religious tolerance deteriorated and religious freedom violations increased in 
India. Minority communities, especially Christians, Muslims, and Sikhs, experienced numerous 
incidents of intimidation, harassment, and violence, largely at the hands of Hindu nationalist 
groups.”  The commission concludes further monitoring of the situation will be done to 131
determine if India should be recommended to the U.S. State Department for designation as a 
“country of particular concern,” under the International Religious Freedom Act for systematic, 
ongoing, egregious violations of religious freedom.  It should be noted that such incidents 132
occur in India no matter the ruling party at New Delhi. This can be remedied by education, and 
 Sharma, A. (2015). “Communal violence in the country up by 25% in first five months of 2015,” The Economic 130
Times, July 21; For a list containing numerous religious incidents throughout India between 2015 and 2016, see 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/communal-violence 
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an enhanced socialization process that does not indoctrinate people to antagonize the other 
(structural peace). 
Pakistan has witnessed religious intolerance too in recent years. It is redolent of the religious 
diaspora in Pakistan, a Sunni Muslim majority country with Shia Muslim, Christian, and Hindu 
minorities being consistently convulsed by sectarian violence. Thousands of people have been 
killed in sectarian attacks since 2008, and sectarian killings rose by more than a fifth from 
2012.  In the recent past, Pakistan has witnessed attacks on Christian colonies, incidents of 133
arson in mosques, and cases are often registered against members of minority communities, with 
accusations of blasphemy. According to some observers, there is a problem with the society’s 
‘collective mindset.’  The structural violence is made salient by the general religious bigotry in 134
the ordinary population, which manifests against minorities. This cultural set up gives religion 
extreme reverence and cultivates an identity based on it, which is extraordinarily sensitive on 
religious matters.  The roots of sectarianism in India and Pakistan, towards religious minority 135
populations can be traced back to partition of the subcontinent. 
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2.2.2. Exogenous or external factors 
America’s relations and influence vis-a-vis Pakistan and India.  
Washington’s relations with Islamabad, as well as New Delhi can be characterized as mixed at 
best. From a historical lens, America tried maintaining cordial relations with both India and 
Pakistan, whilst pursuing broader aims which undermined Pakistani interests.  The same can be 136
said about ties between America and India, which were barely existent till the 1990s. This study 
will focus on relations since 9/11, after which Pakistan was perceived as a crucial base for the 
war effort in Afghanistan owing to its geopolitical proximity. America thus got directly involved 
in South-Asia. Washington and Islamabad weren’t on cordial terms immediately after 9/11, 
which can be traced back to the imposition of military and economic sanctions in response to 
Pakistan’s nuclear program, and the military coup in 1999. The turn of events can thus be traced 
back to 9/11, as sanctions were swept away in exchange for cooperation, and Pakistan provided 
unprecedented access to ports, military bases, airspace, and ground lines of control, and its 
security forces also provided security for American assets.  In return Pakistan regained access 137
to international funding and favor, and arms sales and aid to the Pakistan army and air force 
surged, expanding its entrenched power.   138
Pakistan received several forms of military aid via initiatives such as the CSF, FMF, and EDA. 
Development and economic aid came through ESF and KLB, which were increased substantially. 
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Support was also provided for governance and civil society initiatives.  Additionally, PCF was 139
established to provide assistance in anti-militant operations.  America provided some $28 140
billion between fiscal years 2002 and 2014 to Pakistan via various programs.  Pakistan’s 141
military delivered by achieving several objectives and helped America in vanquishing al-Qaeda. 
Nevertheless, things became controversial as information became available about Pakistan’s 
affiliation with the Taliban,  Haqqani Network, and Lashkar-e-Taiba among others, while also 
rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal.  Although American policymakers knew funding 142
Pakistan was antithetical to national interests, ceasing the funding would be even more 
damaging. “All key American decision makers agree that the Pakistan of late 2014, towards the 
end of the war in Afghanistan, is likely to be a greater danger to itself, its neighbors, and the US 
than it was in 2001.”   143
Furthermore, the Pakistani public began viewing their army with contempt led by the impression 
that it was for hire at the behest of Washington.  On the other hand, Americans increasingly 144
complained too, as they weren’t obtaining preferred outcomes either. Amidst consistent tensions, 
the US raid on Osama bin Laden’s hiding spot in Abbottabad strained relations further. Despite 
Pakistani criticisms, not only has the US supplied immense financial and military assistance, it 
has also been an important vote of support at multilateral institutions such as the IMF, World 
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Bank, and ADB.  Washington’s crucial role in these and other institutions provides significant 145
leverage over Islamabad. America and Pakistan are still struggling to recalibrate ties, and while 
neither side seems to like the other, there appears to be no exit for either.   146
India’s strategic partnership with the USSR undermined relations with Washington since Cold 
War days. Additionally, Washington’s affinity towards Pakistan also undermined its relations 
with New Delhi. With the end of the Cold War, and the dramatic surge in the Indian economy 
caused by reforms in the 1990s which opened the country’s previously closed economy, spurred 
American interest. India’s current growth trajectory makes it important, especially as substantial 
U.S. national interests are aimed at China.  Notable scholars posit that India will be a valuable 147
American partner, as part of its mix of cooperation and containment with China.  India is also 148
an attractive source of economic growth in the backdrop of Western economic decline. 
Furthermore, the Americans fear that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of 
militants, either through theft, or with the connivance of the military.  It can be inferred that 149
this fear is shared by Indians too. Therefore, its in the best interests of America and India to try 
and resolve Kashmir either via mediation, via SAARC, or bilaterally. Owing to its influence, 
America has leverage over Pakistan, and shares cordial ties with India, and can thus be a 
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potential mediator. Additionally, Washington’s status as an observer nation presents opportunities 
for reinforcing SAARC (like it did for the EU).  
China’s Relations and influence vis-a-vis India and Pakistan 
Bilateral relations between China and India can be characterized as mixed, with periods of 
cooperation as well as turmoil. Although from a historical lens both nations share civilizational 
ties dating back millennia, the border war in 1962 altered this trajectory and severely strained 
bilateral relations (till the 1980s). Despite periodic tensions, both nations have deepened bilateral 
ties during the first and second decade of the twenty-first century, emerging as significant trading 
partners.  Nonetheless, suspicion looms large as a recent survey revealed India’s concern 150
pertaining territorial disputes between China and neighboring countries could lead to military 
conflict.  New Delhi and Beijing have also tried to augment bilateral ties towards deeper 151
strategic and military cooperation.   152
In the ambit of multilateral institutions, India and China have much to gain via cooperation in 
BRICs and ADB. As the two most populous countries with consistent economic growth, it could 
be inferred that China and India do not have much to gain from conflict with one another. 
Although border disputes keep popping up time and again, they seem to regard one another’s 
sovereignty, by shelving disputes to maintain bilateral ties. Albeit, if push comes to shove, 
mutual nuclear deterrence acts as an insurance policy. Moreover, India’s recent standpoint on the 
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South China Sea dispute is indicative of goodwill and harmony towards China, which came at 
the expense of American exasperation.   153
China and Pakistan share commendable bilateral relations. Pakistan regards China as its closest 
ally, and devotes considerable attention in shaping its domestic and foreign policy in that regard. 
A recent survey concluded that Pakistanis view the Chinese most favorably after China itself.  154
Beijing is perceived as Islamabad’s strategic ally for obvious reasons: 1) geopolitical proximity; 
2) Chinese military and economic resources; and 3) China and India share antagonistic relations 
after the border war in 1962. Ever since, China has been a credible military source and by 1982, 
“Chinese weapons systems formed the backbone of the Pakistani military arsenal, composing 75 
percent of the tank force and 65 percent of the air force.”  Furthermore, Islamabad is among the 155
main purchasers of Chinese weapons.  Additionally, the Karakoram Highway serves mutual 156
import and export needs, as well as a Chinese roadway to the oil rich Persian Gulf, and Central 
Asia.   157
Although bilateral relations are largely asymmetric, Pakistan and China share a codependency. 
As a bridge to the Muslim world, Pakistan helped China build trade and diplomatic ties with 
Muslim states in the Middle-East and Southeast-Asia. China also benefited from its partnership 
with Pakistan owing to its access to American technology and equipment.  Additionally, as 158
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“China has a large Muslim minority in its western region, having a friendly Muslim neighbor 
was seen as strategically and diplomatically useful.”  Economic ties between both countries 159
have grown steadily throughout the relationship, especially after signing a FTA in 2006.  160
Furthermore, China provides military and nuclear technology and equipment to Pakistan in lieu 
of containing India’s growth and American preponderance. Analysts argue that “China has 
supplied Pakistan with a wide variety of nuclear products and services, ranging from uranium 
enrichment technology to reactors.”  A report of the U.S director of central intelligence deemed 161
China as “the primary source of nuclear-related equipment and technology to Pakistan.”  162
Despite solid ties, recent years have witnessed underlying tensions between the two countries as 
a) Beijing is wary of Chinese Uighurs fighting in Pakistan and Afghanistan; and b) Militant 
proxies on its territory makes Pakistan less useful for China as a security partner, and as a 
conduit for investments and trade.  163
As per current trends, Beijing seems to share mutually beneficial ties with both New Delhi and 
Islamabad. It is highly unlikely that China would get involved in a conflict between India and 
Pakistan, as “China encourages Pakistan to formalize the status quo with India in Kashmir, urges 
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to take its domestic Islamist terrorism seriously, and rebukes its support for islamist terrorists.”  164
Additionally, Beijing’s standpoint can also be traced back to its lack of support during the Kargil 
conflict in 1999 between India and Pakistan.  
The salient asymmetry in size, economic, and military resources verifies that Pakistan is more 
dependent on Chinese assistance than vice versa. It can also be deductively argued that Beijing 
does not desire a complete breakdown between Washington and Islamabad, as replacing the 
formers expensive role would be a tedious task for any country. For a well written and detailed 
account of the dynamics between Beijing and Islamabad, a recent publication on the topic is 
highly recommended.  As a potential mediator in the Kashmir conflict, although Pakistan 165
would gladly endorse China, but India’s standpoint remains unclear owing to Beijing’s own 
stakes involved in Kashmir.  
Saudi Arabia’s relations and influence vis-a-vis Pakistan and India 
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan share ties in the ideological, military, and economic domains. Bilateral 
relations have remained consistent over the decades, and as a fellow muslim country revered as 
the guardian of Islam’s holy lands, Saudi Arabia is perceived by Pakistan as an ideal ideological 
ally.  In addition to ideological and symbolic support, Saudi Arabia has provided Pakistan with 166
various loans, emergency aid, grants, political sanctuary to leaders, disaster relief funds, etc. 
Saudi Arabia benefits from military assistance, as “Pakistan has sporadically offered military 
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manpower to Riyadh and its Gulf Arab allies in return for financing purchases of military 
equipment.”  167
Saudi Arabia and India also share cordial bilateral relations, mainly in the economic, but also in 
strategic and cultural domains. Although from a historical perspective ties date back millennia, 
recent bilateral relations between Riyadh and New Delhi have also witnessed turmoil, which can 
be traced to the formers support of Pakistan’s stance regarding Kashmir. Additionally, Riyadh 
supported Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 at the expense of bilateral relations 
with India.  Nevertheless, enhanced mutual relations of recent years can be traced back to 168
highest-level official visits. Furthermore, India is a key market for oil exports, and one of the top 
purchasers of crude oil from Riyadh.   169
As a provider of ideological and tangible resources, Riyadh also has notable influence over 
domestic political parties in Pakistan. Additionally, cooperation also extends to the nuclear 
domain.  This can be traced back to the high level official visits from Riyadh to Pakistan’s 170
nuclear facilities.  Islamabad and Riyadh have also agreed to establish a military force for the 171
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), augmented by Pakistani manpower to deter Iran.  Despite 172
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notable strategic ties, Islamabad and Riyadh share a seemingly asymmetric relationship as the 
former seems more dependent on the latter than vice-versa. A closer look at the history and 
trajectory of bilateral relation makes this point salient. Pakistan secures domestic energy needs 
by importing from the Gulf at signifiant concessions. With Riyadh’s consent, Islamabad has also 
benefited from OPEC countries’ special funds.  Nevertheless, as Riyadh gains military 173
manpower via friendly ties with Islamabad, bilateral relations are geared to continue on a 
positive trend.  
In the current era, India is rated among the top investors in Saudi Arabia, with projects in diverse 
sectors in management and consultancy services, construction projects, telecommunications, 
information technology, pharmaceuticals, media, culture, agriculture, tourism, and health among 
others.  Enhanced cooperation in political, economic, security and defense related issues are 174
enshrined in joint statements such as: New Delhi Declaration of 2006, and Riyadh Declaration of 
2010.  Bilateral ties have also increased consistently over the years in defense and 175
counterterrorism fronts.  The mutually beneficial ties between New Delhi and Riyadh are 176
salient, making long term prospects reasonable. For India, in addition to being the largest 
supplier of oil, Saudi Arabia is among the largest trading partners. In lieu of the projected 
increase in India’s energy needs, Riyadh is seen as a dependable source. India can also benefit 
from Riyadh’s petroleum expertise in developing domestic oil infrastructure by collaborating 
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with Saudi Aramco, the globally largest petroleum company.  Riyadh’s interest in India is 177
substantiated by consistent economic growth. Therefore, in order to manifest longer term mutual 
benefits, the interests of both New Delhi and Riyadh lie in maintaining solid bilateral ties. In the 
event of mediation, it is difficult to infer Riyadh’s preferences. Although it can be argued that 
Riyadh will be accepted as a mediator by Islamabad, New Delhi’s position is unclear. 
Nevertheless, its potential mediatory capacity should not be discarded.  
 The Diplomat. (2016). “The Future of India-Saudi Arabia Relations: With complementary needs in trade and 177
investment, New Delhi and Riyadh can take their relationship to the next level.” April 30.
!67
2.3. Analyzing the regional dynamics of South-Asia 
SouthAsia is referred as the least integrated region in the world not only in terms of intraregional 
trade, but also in people to people contact and interchange of ideas.  In the past two decades, 178
exports from South Asia have doubled and risen, whereas exports in South Asia have been rather 
low at below 5 percent.  The idea of institutionalizing regional integration was first conceived 179
in 1980 by the President of Bangladesh.  This can be traced back to the poor economic impetus 180
of the region in a post-colonial environment. As mutual economic benefit was a common 
expectation, Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives and Sri Lanka swiftly accepted the proposal of 
institutionalizing regional cooperation. Although things were perceived differently by the two 
regional powers as neither of them were interested in the idea of regional integration,  they 181
agreed upon insistence of regional members and SAARC was established in 1985. This section 
will examine intra-regional relations in light of regional integration, as well as India-Pakistan 
dynamics with SAARC members.  
Intra-regional dynamics  
There is a salient asymmetry in terms of size, power, and resources in South-Asia. India’s 
military, economic, demographic, and geopolitical endowments are a consistent source of 
concern for South-Asian states, especially from a Westphalian perspective. Consequently, a 
major hurdle for integration is caused by the hegemonic perception of India. Scholars posit 
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hegemonic states may be necessary and must take the lead in production of global (in this case, 
regional) public goods because smaller states lack the incentives or the capacity to do so.  This 182
is also relevant in regional contexts where such conditions apply, as hegemony on a regional 
level can be less intimidating than on a global level. Additionally, regional hegemons can be 
constrained by institutional rules and frameworks.  
Scholars demonstrate the potential in international institutions to solve problems of coordination 
and free riding in the period after hegemony.  This is relevant in the context of South-Asia, vis-183
a-vis SAARC. For instance, it is aptly argued that although American power after WWII rested 
on a network of institutions that constrained it, but also increased its power to act with others.  184
This is an important point in assessing power of nations in the current international system.  185
Perceived Indian hegemony can be mitigated by members as well as observer States. As South-
Asian states perceive India as a hegemon, the other alternative is strengthening the institutional 
capacity of SAARC. Efforts in this direction will reap benefits for the entire region, but it is 
easier said than done, owing to bilateral tensions. Nevertheless, integration could provide the 
panacea for these tensions. There are examples of smaller states with antagonistic relations with 
regional hegemons, who benefited from regional integration. e.g. Poland and Germany.  
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The nature of foreign relations within the region  
As the highest generator of per capita income and literacy rate in South-Asia, Sri Lanka is an 
influential country in regional dynamics. From a historical perspective, India and Sri Lanka share 
deep ties along socio-cultural, ethnic, historical, and linguistic domains. Nevertheless, the intense 
civil war in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009 strained bilateral relations. The antagonism 
between Tamils and buddhists sparked an involvement by India, owing largely to the affluential 
southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu.  Indian Tamils were perceived as sympathetic to the 186
LTTE, who were designated terrorists fighting for the creation of a separate state for Sri Lankan 
Tamils.  As involvement caused severe complexities pertaining domestic separatist Tamils, as 187
well as the Sri Lankan government, India refused any subsequent involvement in the conflict.  188
Although bilateral relations have improved since, disputes regarding fishing in the waters of Palk 
Strait  keep erupting time and again.  On the other hand, Pakistan and Sri Lanka share close 189 190
bilateral ties in the economic and military domains. Islamabad assisted Colombo by supplying 
hight-tech military equipment during the civil war.  Bilateral relations have grown stronger 191
over the recent years, culminating in the signing of a civil nuclear energy deal in 2015. 
As a constituent part of the subcontinent before its partition, Bangladesh shares close historical 
ties with both India and Pakistan. Bilateral relations between Bangladesh and India are based on 
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civilizational ties, who share common heritage, music, art, literature, language, culture, costume, 
consonant, and so on. Although India played a major role in the independence of Bangladesh, 
sovereignty related issues strained bilateral relations. Tensions concerning a myriad of issues 
such as legal migration, insurgency, border and water disputes, and the Moore island in the Bay 
of Bengal.  Nevertheless, signing of the historic land boundary agreement in 2015 marked a 192
new era in bilateral relations, which also alleviated border disputes. Economic relations between 
India and Bangladesh are significant, making them solid partners within South-Asia. 
Cooperation has been enhanced further by a trade deal which allows the two nations to use each 
other’s land and water routes for sending goods to a third country, removing a long-standing 
barrier in regional trade.   193
Bangladesh and Pakistan share complicated bilateral dynamics. Despite consistent trade 
relations, inherent tensions can be traced back to the liberation war. Additionally, despite 
persistent efforts from Dhaka in seeking Islamabad to acknowledge the genocide committed by 
its army in 1971, and apologize for crimes against humanity, Pakistan has failed to deliver.  It 194
can be argued that although a majority of people in both nations sympathize with one another 
owing to shared ethnic and cultural ties, official bilateral ties are limited. Relations are also often 
strained by terrorist links, as numerous Pakistan based terrorist groups train and operate in 
Bangladesh. Furthermore, prominent events in the recent years have strained bilateral relations. 
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For instance, the execution of Abdul Quader Molla for war crimes in 1971 caused outbursts in 
Pakistan.  Additionally, recent eviction of two Pakistani diplomats from the High Commission 195
in Dhaka who were allegedly funding terrorist activities, caused further diplomatic rifts.  196
Pakistan has similarly expelled a Bangladeshi diplomat from Islamabad earlier this year.  197
Current bilateral relations are scarred by these recent diplomatic incidents. 
Maldives is the other island nation besides Sri Lanka in South-Asia, whose geopolitical location 
makes it strategically significant in the Indian ocean. The bilateral relations between Maldives 
and India are characterized as “beneficial bilateralism,” as the two countries share close ties in 
the economic, cultural, military, and strategic domains.  India and Maldives have apparently 198
forged an alliance based on the strategic interests and mutual benefit of one another.  Maldives 199
also shares cordial bilateral relations with Pakistan, with enhanced cooperation in recent times.  200
As a founding member of SAARC, and South Asian Economic Union, and signatory to SAFTA, 
it can be argued that Maldives will accept and endorse deeper regional integration. As a matter of 
fact, based on close ties with both New Delhi and Islamabad, Male could also be a potential 
mediator in the Kashmir conflict, if the need arises. 
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Bhutan shares cordial bilateral relations with India, Pakistan, and pretty much all the states in 
South-Asia other than Nepal, with whom it has witnessed diplomatic rifts owing to refugee 
crises.  Bhutan and India share significant bilateral ties in the economic, cultural, and military 201
domains. Bilateral economic and trade ties are also notable between these two neighboring 
states, as India is Bhutan’s largest trading partner, stimulated by the bilateral FTA. Additionally, 
Bhutan is one of the largest recipients of foreign aid and investment from India. Ties also extend 
to educational and cultural exchange, tourism, IT, hydropower and so on. India supports Bhutan 
with security and defense related issues, in addition to training Bhutanese armed forces and 
police.  Additionally, ties are projected to become better in the near future.  Bhutan also 202 203
shares cordial bilateral relations with Pakistan, but the two countries do not have an embassy or 
commission in one another’s territory. Bhutan is highly likely to support regional integration.  
Nepal shares notable bilateral relations with India due to close historical, cultural, religious, and 
ethnic ties. As fellow hindu majority countries, India and Nepal share a unique relationship of 
mutual friendship and cooperation, characterized by open borders and deep-rooted people-to-
people contact.  In lieu of the earthquakes in 2015, the Indian government provided medical as 204
well as disaster response teams and special aircrafts with rescue and relief materials to various 
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parts in Nepal, in addition to millions of dollars worth aid.  Bilateral trade is also significant, 205
coupled with foreign aid and investment from India in numerous sectors and projects in Nepal. 
Nevertheless, the recent Madhesi crisis regarding differences in Nepal’s newly framed 
constitution, strained bilateral ties.  This crisis contributed in the culmination of an ‘anti-India’ 206
sentiment in Nepal, which is prevalent in current bilateral relations.    207
Nepal and Pakistan have maintained cordial relations over recent decades, and mutually regard 
each other’s territorial integrity, sovereignty, and peaceful development.  Minimal trade can be 208
traced back to the fact that these two countries do not share common borders. Furthermore, in 
light of recent tensions regarding monarchy, and amidst alienation from India and the Western 
world, Nepal developed closer bilateral ties with Pakistan.  In light of regional integration, it is 209
highly unlikely that Nepal will have objections, owing to domestic benefits and founding 
membership of SAARC.  
Although the newest member of SAARC, Afghanistan is of significant relevance to India and 
Pakistan. In light of regional integration, the security scenario in Afghanistan is fundamental for 
both regional powers. Afghanistan and India share solid bilateral relations based on historical and 
cultural ties, which can be traced back to the Indus valley civilization. In terms of economic 
relations, India has contributed billions of dollars in various aid and infrastructure related 
 Ibid. 205
 BBC News.  (2015).  “UN:  Nepal  blockade  puts  millions  of  children  at  risk,”  November  30.  Access:  http://206
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34968252 
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November 4. 
 Embassy of Nepal in Pakistan. Accessed on 12 May 2016. http://www.nepalembassy.pk/nepal-pakistan-relations 208
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projects, making Afghanistan one of the major recipients of foreign aid from India.  Bilateral 210
relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been complicated of late,  due to a host of 211
issues such as the Durand line, border issues, water sharing, the insurgency war, among others. 
Nevertheless, the two Islamic republics share strong cultural and historical ties. Furthermore, in 
the backdrop of NATO and U.S troop withdrawal, the stability and maintenance of the currently 
fragile Afghan democracy hinges on the cooperation between New Delhi and Islamabad. 
Eminent jihadi threats are also prevalent for the international community.  A smaller 212
international security presence will embolden terrorist networks, and worsen the fragile security 
scenario.  In this, and a wider regional context, it is fundamental for India to reconcile with 213
Pakistan and resolve the Kashmir dispute peacefully, in order to maintain its investments, and 
also to increase bilateral trade via transit routes to Afghanistan. The Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit 
trade agreement presents tremendous opportunities for these three SAARC members. 
Furthermore, a closer look at Afghanistan illustrates a mutual respect for the others strategic 
interests. For instance, despite a security pact with Afghanistan,  India has provided limited 214
training to Afghan forces, that too on Indian territory, in order to avoid instigating Pakistan. This 
could be traced as India’s regard for Pakistan’s strategic concerns in its immediate regional 
 For further details on economic and bilateral relations, see Ministry of External Affairs (2014). India-Afghanistan 210
Relations, Government of India, Access: http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Afghnistan_Dec2014.pdf 
 See, Thier, Alexander, J. (2008). “On the Issues: Afghanistan/Pakistan,” United States Institute of Peace, USIP 211
Publications.;  The Dawn (2015). “Pak-Afghan relations: Hanging by a thread,” September 12.
 UN Doc SC/RES/11817 (2015). 212
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sphere, as the latter considers itself as the legitimate regional influence in Afghanistan. Kabul’s 
requests of arms deals from India have also been dropped, essentially not to exacerbate tensions 
between New Delhi and Islamabad.  Greater security in Afghanistan is also in Pakistan’s 215
domestic interests. Afghanistan has the potential for tremendous gains via regional integration, 
but the security provisions could only be manifested by cooperation between New Delhi and 
Islamabad. In other words, without the latter’s assistance, the former cannot provide and 
maintain security, and vice versa. It can be asserted that cooperation between the regional powers 
in Afghanistan could be a prerequisite of regional integration in South-Asia. 
It should now be clear what kind of codependence India and Pakistan share with their regional 
neighbors. India has a major role to play, but in order for the region to develop and benefit from 
integration, Pakistan’s consent is crucial. 
 Ayres, Alyssa. (2015). CFR.215
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2.4. Comparing the EU and ASEAN: insights for SAARC 
This case study will compare the regional organizations EU and ASEAN, to draw insights for 
SAARC. The EU is regarded as the most advanced manifestation of regional integration in the 
world, and is proposed as a putative regional model.  Although a relatively new institution, 216
ASEAN is chosen for its prominence in the developing world. This case study will apply the 
method of structured, focused comparison, based on the premises that the same general questions 
will be asked of both cases, and the same independent variables will be employed across both 
cases. Although, as noted earlier, insights for SAARC is one of the main abstract independent 
variables for this study, its operationalization hinges on this case study, which employs further 
compact heuristic IVs of its own. Comparisons between the EU and ASEAN does not imply that 
SAARC, or other regional organizations have to learn from the EU, and ASEAN. Rather, all 
regional organizations actively look for solutions to distinct problems of collective action and 
policy coordination between member states.   217
Different regions have unique intra-regional dynamics, balance of power politics, and a distinct 
set of conflicts. Thus it is difficult to compare regions, although that is not the goal here. Instead, 
the goal is to draw insights from the regional integration experiences of the EU and ASEAN. 
Therefore, keeping aside complexities and differences between EU and ASEAN, the primary 
goal of this section is to present insights for SAARC (dependent variable). The five heuristically 
developed IVs for this case study are: basic objectives, regional structures or institutions, 
economic integration, state sovereignty, and transnational civil society actors.  
 Rosamond, B. (2005). “Conceptualizing the EU model of governance in world politics.”  pp.463–478.216
 Rosamond, B., and Alex, Warleigh-Lack. (2011). Studying regions comparatively: back to the future? pp.18–35.; 217
Camroux, D. (2011). Interregionalism, a critique: the four levels of EU-ASEAN relations, pp.201–271.
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2.4.1. Basic Objectives  
The basic objectives denote the fundamental purpose of a regional organization, for which it is 
established. In other words, although different regional organizations entail distinct historical 
backgrounds and characteristics, region specific dynamics, and a set of conflicts amidst member 
states, it can be argued that regional organizations are established to maintain peace and order in 
a region, deepen economic and political interdependence, and present an opportunity for 
cooperation and consensus building among regional neighbors. It can be strongly argued that 
such basic objectives of regional organizations are universal.  
Although some regional organizations may differ from others in structure, level of 
institutionalism, and decision-making among others, basic principles essentially remain the 
same. For instance, the EU’s basis of economic integration as a means towards political 
reconciliation and integration is not very relevant to ASEAN’s culture of non-interference in the 
context of newly independent states, who guard their sovereignty in the face of disputes 
regarding territorial claims (such as coup d’état in Thailand, and South-China sea, among 
others).  But this does not mean EU and ASEAN were established for very different reasons. 218
Both these organizations (including SAARC) were established to institutionalize economic and 
political interdependence among members, to resolve conflict through peaceful dialogue and 
consensus, and to increase people to people contact and exchange of ideas for social progress. 
Another basic objective (or prerequisite) of regional organizations is cooperation between 
members, specially the regional powers. Even if regional powers are antagonistic and do not 
desire to cooperate, they are provided with a common platform to get involved in exchange of 
 Wong, R. (2012). Model power or reference point? The EU and the ASEAN Charter. pp.669-682.218
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dialogue and consensus building. The system for this may differ in different organizations, but it 
is arguably based on the same idea. 
2.4.2. Regional structures or institutions  
In must be stated at the outset that although national priorities remain significant in any regional 
organization, regional institutional structures have a remarkable impact on community, or society 
building in a region. Additionally, specific institutions present the opportunity to address specific 
issues of regional concern. The institutionalization examples of the EU are noteworthy, which 
has established a plethora of institutions for different purposes, e.g. common market, bank, 
atomic energy cooperation, legal institutions, educational institutions, and defense, among many 
others. Such institutionalization has also led, or rather inspired ASEAN to develop under its 
ambit, distinct regional institutions for specific purposes. Some examples regarding 
establishment of ASEAN institutions are: AICHR in 2009, ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in 
2012, ASEAN Commission on the Rights of Minorities in 2010, and Committee of Permanent 
Representatives from the ASEAN member states. Consequently, scholars have indicated that this 
can be attributed to the EU’s reference as a ‘model power.’  Furthermore, European 219
policymakers have asserted that the EU model, which holds important lessons for the wider 
world, should be promoted not as a super power, but rather as a “model power.”  Scholarly 220
 See for instance Jetschke, Anja. (2009). Institutionalizing ASEAN, pp.407–426.; Zielonka, Jan. (2008). “Europe 219
as a global actor: empire by example?” pp.471–484.;  Lenz, Tobias. (2008). “Problematizing the EU’s model export 
to Mercosur: strategies and motivations,” Paper presented at the GARNET conference on the European Union in 
International Affairs, Brussels, 24–26 April.; Jokela, Juha. (2009). “The European Union as an international actor: 
Europeanization and institutional changes in the light of the EU’s Asia policies’   pp.37–53.
 Zielonka,  Jan.  (2008).  pp.482-484.;  Miliband,  David.  (2007).  “Europe 2030: model power not superpower,” 220
Speech delivered at the College of Europe, Bruges, 15 November. 
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views are divergent, as some acknowledge the EU as an inspiration and reference for ASEANs 
institutional modernization, whereas see the EU as an inspiration, not a model.  Nevertheless, 221
in terms of institutionalization, the EU experience has been rather exemplary in the institutional 
design and evolution of ASEAN, and holds important insights for SAARC. It is redolent of 
scholarly analyses that intraregional trade within ASEAN, and SAARC is not as significant, or 
even comparable to EU. The extensive intraregional trade in the EU is supplemented by a 
common market, regulations, monetary policy, a bank, parliament, commission, as well as a 
court. EU is referred to as the most advanced regional institution for its distinct institutional 
structures. In contrast, ASEAN has so far been unable to make full use of its region-wide FTA, 
i.e., AFTA and prefers free trade on a bilateral, rather than a multilateral basis. The same can be 
said for SAARC, as the existence of a regional FTA, i.e. SAFTA has not contributed to 
significant increase in intra-regional trade. Despite the existence of SAFTA, trade within the 
region remains at a bare minimum. It can thus be inferred that regional institutions are 
fundamental.  
Additional features of institutionalization of ASEAN include the summit meetings twice every 
year; designation of Foreign Ministers of member states as the ASEAN Coordinating Council; 
Chairmanship for high-level ASEAN bodies; and the formation of the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives to ASEAN, based in Jakarta, the de facto capital of the organization, akin to 
Brussels.  Similarly, SAARC too has manifested a certain level of institutionalization, i.e. 222
 See  for  instance  Yeo,  George.  (2007).  Europe in  21st  century  Asia,  pp.9–12.;  Chalermpalanupap,  Termsak. 221
(2010).  Life in ASEAN after  the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter,  pp.45–65.;  Acharya,  Amitav.  (2009). 
Arguing about ASEAN: what do we disagree about? pp.493–499.
ASEAN.  (2008a).  ASEAN  Charter,  http://www.asean.org/storage/images/ASEAN_RTK_2014/222
ASEAN_Charter.pdf  Article 12. accessed on 16 May 2016.
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designated yearly summits, a secretariat, standing committee, technical and action committees, 
and an economic union. Some notable agreements are: the South Asia Preferential Trade 
Agreement (SAPTA) signed in 1993, and the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) 
signed in 2004. Nevertheless, for these to work at par with advanced regional organizations such 
as EU, deeper institutionalization is fundamental. For instance, as is the case with EU and 
ASEAN, there is no committee or council of SAARC permanent representatives based in the de 
facto capital of Kathmandu. Member states can thus cut off diplomatic ties in lieu of bilateral 
conflicts, as redolent of India and Pakistan relations as SAARC members. Without permanent 
representatives in the de facto capital, it is difficult to maintain consistent communication for 
matters pertaining regional concern.  
Furthermore, as it is widely believed that the EU functions on its doctrine of a rules-based 
organization which strictly adheres to the rule of law in any and every situation, as compared to 
ASEANs norm based culture of mutual dialogue and consensus building. This is substantiated by 
the fact that distinct legal institutions are existent in the EU, which addresses issues of regional 
concern. These are lacking in ASEAN and SAARC. Although there is a commitment to a more 
formalized structure in the ASEAN Charter, scholarly views differ as to “ASEAN’s value in 
promoting regional integration and further institution building, as its mandate and influence are 
limited.”  Therefore, although institutions are deemed important, “ASEAN patterns of inter-223
 Stanley Foundation and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Swedish School of 223
Advanced Asia Pacific Studies of The Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher 
Education. (2008). Challenges to Effective Multilateralism: Comparing Asian and European Experiences. Sweden: 
Sigtuna. p.9.
!81
state cooperation are looser and less regulated than the EU’s codified methods of decision 
making.”  The same can be said about SAARC.  224
2.4.3. Economic integration 
Economic integration is a crucial aspect of regional integration in any region, with tangible 
economic benefits for regional members. This is summed up by the former Secretary-General of 
ASEAN, who posits, “like Europe, a regional consciousness in ASEAN must first aim at the 
integration of the regional economy.”  Economic integration is one of the basic objectives of 225
regional integration, as noted earlier. However, the level of integration depends on the 
organization itself, along with region specific dynamics. It can be inferred that EU maintains 
significant levels of intraregional trade owing to its advanced institutions and supranational 
capacity to support it. A common bank, monetary policy, and regular meetings of representatives 
of member states makes this possible. On the other hand, ASEAN maintains a decent account of 
intraregional trade, but not comparable to EU. The difference gets starker in light of SAARC 
intraregional trade, accounting for 5 percent of total trade in the region, as compared to over 55 
percent in the EU, and approximately 22 percent in ASEAN.  This is peculiar in the context of 226
SAARC, as countries in the region have individually maintained consistent economic growth 
over the past years, but with negligent growth per capita. Therefore, it could be inferred that 
economic integration might play a strong role in further gross domestic growth, as well as 
 Murray, P. (2010). Comparative regional integration in the EU and East Asia, p.312.224
 Severino, Rodolfo. (2008). ASEAN, Southeast Asia Background Series 10, Singapore: ISEAS. 225
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growth in the per capita aspect. Additionally, economic integration presents tangible benefits for 
countries in South-Asia which do not share borders, but share cordial bilateral relations.  
Furthermore, whereas the EU works on a system based on having its own budget and resources, 
this is not the case in ASEAN (and SAARC). Although ASEAN has been effective in generating 
increased intraregional trade, its not as significant as EU, as most manufactured products are 
exported to developed nations outside ASEAN.  In EU, “the commitment to agreed economic 227
policies complements the single market and the common currency, the euro, and market and 
regulatory mechanisms are key features of EU economic integration.”  One of the significant 228
benefits of economic integration is an increase in intra-regional trade. This has been personified 
as a major success of the EU, and an emerging success for ASEAN (as it lacks a singular or 
common economic ideology). 
2.4.4. State sovereignty 
While the EU can be characterized as post-Westphalian, ASEAN (and SAARC) remains firmly 
Westphalian. The EU’s strength lies in the pooling of sovereignty of member states, and the 
organization functions on the basis of the rule of law. For the construction of an advanced 
supranational entity, the individual European states pooled in their singular sovereign capacities 
to devise a collective capacity. On the other hand, ASEAN functions on the basis of consensus, 
respect for the sovereignty, and non-interference in domestic affairs of member states. Therefore, 
the role of the individual states is crucial, as non-interference is one of the fundamental norms of 
 Ruland, J. and Jetschke, A. (2008). 40 years of ASEAN, pp.397–409.227
 Murray, P. (2010). pp.308-323.228
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the organization. In other words, in ASEAN, national sovereignty is the basis as well as focus of 
cooperation, as per the intergovernmental nature of the ASEAN Charter.  It can thus be inferred 229
that EU is a rules based organization, whereas ASEAN is norms based. For instance, in light of 
the Greek sovereign debt crisis, the EU intervened as a collective entity (albeit with the politics 
of other member states, but the point is collective action). In comparison, the recent coup d’état 
in Thailand witnessed that the members of ASEAN did not take any action to intervene in 
Thailand’s domestic affairs.  
Therefore, although there are certain similarities between EU and ASEAN as basic objectives, 
but the major point of difference is the fundamental doctrine of state sovereignty and collective 
identity based on which these regional organizations function. The key characteristics of 
consensus and consultation in the ASEAN charter  marks a stark difference with EU’s style of 230
collective action via qualified or weighted majority. Sovereignty is most important for ASEAN, 
which recognizes “the right of every state, large or small, to lead its national existence free from 
outside interference in its internal affairs as this interference will adversely affect its freedom, 
independence and integrity.”  A similar inference can be made about SAARC, which is similar 231
to ASEAN vis-a-vis non-interference, respect for sovereignty, and newly gained independence. 
This can be traced back to the fact that “nation and state-building are largely completed projects 
in Europe but incomplete or recent completions in most ASEAN countries.”  Furthermore, in 232
ASEAN, “the US role was to instigate a hub and spokes relationship with the nations of East 
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Asia.”  In other words, there were no American provisions of political or financial support for 233
the creation of a regional entity in East Asia, in stark contrast to Europe. 
2.4.5. Transnational civil society actors in a globalized world  
In today’s globalized and interconnected world, coexistence and interdependence are vital, and 
regional organizations of all hues address, or intend to address these factors. The same can be 
said for the EU as well as ASEAN. Furthermore, the operation of transnational civil society 
networks and NGOs are crucial, alongside political processes between states of a region. For 
instance, in the backdrop of globalization, some see unifying outlooks in East Asia, coupled with 
“increased awareness of globalization, the development of broader perspectives, such as 
commitments to democracy, human rights, cooperation, friendship among nations, and finally, 
common values against war, exploitation, racism and injustice.”  Furthermore, scholars 234
incrementally regard regional organizations as a means for dealing with the challenges of 
globalization.   235
Some scholars argue, “no matter when they began, all processes of regionalization in the 
contemporary global political economy can be understood as products of member state 
adaptations to globalization, with particular dynamics dictated by the interplay of national 
interests, culture, norms and geopolitical context.”  Ravenhill relates growing interdependence 236
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to “increasingly open domestic economies and changing perceptions of states’ identities and 
interests, and to the political decision to pursue interdependence.”  Additionally, the emergence 237
of NGOs and the attempts at the construction of global civil society networks are important 
features.  In East Asia, there are several transnational NGOs and civil society networks with a 238
distinct Asian character. In Pempel’s terminology, the relationship between interdependence and 
connectedness is evident in both Europe and East Asia, and connectedness is an increasingly 
important theme in East Asia in terms of culture, NGOs and business.  He compares the pan-239
Asian interest in cultural activities such as karaoke and multinational singing groups with the 
political tendencies towards interdependence, connectedness and cohesiveness based on trade, 
investment, and environmental cooperation among others.  Regions are thus the product of 240
both top-down and bottom-up processes. Transnational civil society actors are negligent in 
South-Asia, as the region is redolent of top-down approaches in light of regional processes. This 
presents important insights to include transnational NGOs, civil society actors and networks as 
part of a bottom-up approach. 
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3. The Future of Power in South-Asia 
3.1. A general overview  
As the title of this chapter indicates, insights will be drawn heavily from Joseph Nye’s study, for 
the specific types of power in South-Asia which are crucial prerequisites for regional integration. 
The aim of this chapter is to elucidate the importance of soft and smart power as core 
prerequisites of regional integration in South-Asia. More specifically, and in addition to the 
utility of these two types of power in the context of the entire region, it will emphasize on their 
validity regarding the resolution of conflict in Kashmir. In South-Asia, the power asymmetry is 
salient in general, i.e between the regional powers India and Pakistan, and also between India 
and the other regional states to a more extreme measure. An overview of the geopolitical 
structure of the South-Asian region illustrates the immense asymmetries, which have made for an 
asymmetrical power structure in South Asia, coupled with wariness among the smaller SAARC 
countries of India’s potential dominance in the region.   241
In terms of size, India accounts for approximately 72 percent of the region’s area, approx. 77 
percent of the population, and generates approx. 76 percent of the total exports in the region.  242
This makes it absolutely clear that conventional or hard power endowments of New Delhi on 
their own are insufficient to maintain order and cooperation in the region via integration. 
Although effective military force remains one of the key power resources in international affairs, 
 Hussain, Mushadid. (1993). ‘Indian power projection in South Asia and the regional states’ reaction’, in Hafeez 241
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the world is no longer akin to nineteenth-century Europe when historians characterized a “great 
power” as one capable of prevailing in war.  India’s prevalence in three full scale wars have 243
proven arguably insufficient in manifesting structural peace, especially in Kashmir. The salient 
structural violence can be cured through soft power in a smart strategy. Furthermore, economic 
power is of little relevance in the context of India and Pakistan as there is no substantial trade 
which could act as deterrence.  
Strong States are often presented with the need to bulk up their capabilities in other variants of 
power, namely soft and smart power.  As Nye recalls in his book, the French deal of selling a 244
nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan in the mid-1970s that could extract plutonium, was 
cancelled by the U.S through trust and persuasion.  As a matter of fact, hard power witnesses 245
adverse affects in due course of time, as made evident in global affairs, for e.g. US involvement 
in Iraq, Russia’s in Georgia, China’s in Tibet, and so on.  
A CSIS commission concluded that it is necessary to move from exporting fear to inspiring 
optimism and hope.  Pure hard power resources, essentially meaning military and economic 246
resources do not necessarily provide preferred outcomes, especially in the long run. In agreement 
with Nye, power needs to be understood under the conditions of a revolutionized information 
technology and globalization in this second decade of the twenty-first century. Conventional 
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wisdom has always held that the state with the largest military prevails, but in an information age 
it may be the state (or non states) with the best story that wins.  This statement places emphasis 247
on soft power, which in turn is manifested by a strategy of smart power to obtain preferred 
outcomes. As the case with India demonstrates, wielding soft power resources is different from 
converting those resources into desired outcomes. In order not to digress from the main issue 
here, this section will not focus on India’s soft power resources, but instead recommend the 
volumes already available on that topic.  The objective is instead to take a closer look at 248
conversion of soft-power resources into desired outcomes via a smart power strategy. But in 
order to construct a smart power strategy, it is fundamental to understand the sources of soft 
power, and avenues for conversion into implementable strategies and consequent policies. 
3.2. Conceptualizing soft and smart power 
Power is a surprisingly elusive and contested concept, which makes it challenging to measure 
and operationalize. As a result, any attempt to develop a single index of power should maintain 
that power depends upon human relationships that vary in different contexts.  While some 249
define power as the ability to make or resist change, others define it as the ability to get what we 
want.  In short, power is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes. It is not much different at the 250
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level of nation states, as a notable book on foreign policy defines power as “getting people or 
groups do what they don't want to do.”  “From a policy-oriented perspective, a concept of 251
power depends upon a specified context to tell us who gets what, how, where, and when.”   252
Additionally, “soft power is the ability to affect others through co-optive means of framing the 
agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.”  253
Furthermore, Nye defines smart power as “the able combination of the hard power of coercion 
and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction into effective strategy to be 
implemented in varying contexts.”  Thus, it essentially concerns a strategy to implement policy 254
by combining hard and soft power resources. In order to effectively utilize soft-power and avoid 
backfires it is vital to elucidate its sources, and means of conversion. 
3.3. Sources of soft power 
As Nye posits, “the soft power of a country rests heavily on three basic resources: its culture (in 
places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and 
abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral 
authority).”  Nye emphasizes on the parenthetical conditions as key to determining whether 255
soft power resources translate into the desired behavior of attraction that can influence desirable 
outcomes. In soft power, what the recipient thinks is particularly important, and matters as much 
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as the agent itself, because attraction and persuasion are socially constructed.  If India and 256
Pakistan are to become mutually attractive with one another, the prospects of damaging conflicts 
will be reduced. Soft power need not be a zero sum game in which India’s gain is necessarily 
Pakistan’s loss, or Pakistan’s gain is India’s loss. 
As soft power is widely known as the power of attraction, at the level of States, three clusters of 
qualities of the agent and action are central to attraction namely: benignity, competence, and 
charisma.  “Benignity is an aspect of how an agent relates to others, and being perceived as 257
such tends to generate sympathy, trust, credibility, and acquiescence; Competence refers to how 
an agent does things, and produces admiration, respect, and emulation; Charisma is an aspect of 
an agent’s relations to ideals, values, and vision, and it tends to produce inspiration and 
adherence.”  These clusters of qualities are crucial for converting resources such as cultures, 258
values, and policies into power behavior. Additionally, the production or generation of soft power 
by attraction hinges on the qualities of the agent in addition to how these are perceived by the 
intended audiences. The lack of these perceived qualities may create adverse effects such as 
indifference and revulsion, the opposite of soft power.   259
Attraction is thus an important aspect of soft power. Another equally important aspect is 
persuasion, which is closely related to attraction. Nye regards persuasion as the use of argument 
to influence the beliefs and actions of others without the threat of force or promise of payment. 
 Ibid. 256
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“In persuasion, rational argument appealing to facts, beliefs about causality, and normative 
premises are mixed with the framing of issues in attractive ways and the use of emotional 
appeals.”  In turn, framing of an agenda is closely related to persuasion, as an attractively 260
framed argument is more likely to be persuasive, if perceived as legitimate by the recipient.  261
Moreover, much persuasion is indirect, and is mediated through large audiences rather than 
solely by elites. This is why bottom-up approaches is a crucial part of the eclectic framework of 
this study. Perceptions of legitimacy may also involve third-party audiences, and indirect 
attempts at persuasion often involve efforts to persuade with emotional appeals in narratives 
rather than pure logic.  To reiterate, perception is crucial in soft-power. This evaluation is also 262
relevant in the context of international mediation of the Kashmir conflict by third parties. 
3.4. Conversion of soft power  
When India’s rising power is discussed, the focus tends to be on the large populations and 
increased economic and military resources. But whether those resources can actually be 
converted into preferred outcomes hinges on New Delhi’s skill in converting resources into 
strategies that will produce preferred outcomes. Conversion of power can either be done directly 
by government initiatives, or through ordinary people, but its best when done by both. Nye 
regards soft power mostly as government initiatives, placing it within the ambit of a top-down 
 Keohane,  R.  O.  (2009).  “Subversive  Realism and the  Problem of  Persuasion”  (paper  delivered at  Stanford 260
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approach. In other words, a top-down approach of soft power essentially entails leaders’ and 
elites’ decision making, policies, actions, and behavior. Shashi Tharoor builds upon Nye’s 
concept, and concludes that soft power is partly related to governance, and partly despite 
governance.  This places his version of soft-power within the ambit of bottom-up approaches 263
which concerns larger publics and civil societies, such as news media, film and television, 
culture, consonant, costume, custom, and so on. Additionally, networks composed of NGOs, civil 
society networks and organizations, inter-governmental organizations, transnational corporations, 
think tanks, etc is also crucial to facilitate a synthesis of ideas. Therefore, it can be inferred that 
soft power works best as a combination of a top-down, as well as bottom-up approach. 
Additionally, Nye presents two models that elucidate how soft power affects its targets, namely: 
direct and indirect. These two models are analogous with the top-down, and bottom-up 
approaches of this study. The first or direct model is essentially a top-down approach, in which 
leaders may be attracted and persuaded by the qualities (benignity, competence, and charisma) of 
other leaders. The second or indirect model is more common, which involves a two-step model 
in which publics and third parties are influenced, and they in turn effect leaders decisions.   264
Regarding the usage of soft power by governments or States, one study suggests three necessary 
conditions for effective use via the second model pertaining public opinion: 1) communicating to 
an intended target in a functioning marketplace of ideas; 2) persuading the target to change its 
attitude on a political issue, and; 3) ensuring the new attitude influences political outcomes.  265
 Tharoor, S. (2012). Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century.263
 Nye, J. S. (2011). The Future of Power, pp.94-95.264
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These are important aspects to change another government’s policy through soft power. Such an 
approach represents civil society and non state actors, which are often seen as credible. For 
instance, NGOs, sports events and Bollywood can contribute significantly towards India’s soft 
power in the Pakistani society than most government initiatives. Tharoor talks in detail about 
non-government initiatives in soft power in a book footnoted earlier. The proceeding section will 
address public diplomacy as a means for States to manifest soft power in civil societies abroad.  
Public Diplomacy 
Public diplomacy essentially entails states’ capacity to communicate with the publics of other 
countries in an effort to indirectly influence their government. States’ efforts to influence foreign 
publics is not new. For instance, the French government in the late nineteenth century created the 
Alliance Française to popularize French culture. The American government during the world war 
organized tours and persuaded Hollywood to make films that portrayed the U.S in a positive 
light.  The conversion of soft power by governments can be operationalized by public 266
diplomacy means such as state commissioned films, televised shows, exchange and training 
programs. These can be measured in turn by opinion polls and surveys by NGOs and IGOs.  
Additionally, as Nye argues, narratives are the currency of soft power. Furthermore, conveying 
information and selling a positive image are part of public diplomacy, but it also involves 
building long-term relationships that create an enabling environment for government policies.  267
To put it simply, the effectiveness of PD is measured by minds changed in a positive light. 
 Rosenberg, E. (1981). Spreading the American Dream, pp.79-100.266
 For a thorough survey of American public diplomacy, see Nakamura, K., and Matthew Weed, M. (2009). U.S. 267
Public Diplomacy: Background and Current Issues, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
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As a strategy, the centralized mass media approach to PD plays a vital role as its main strength is 
its audience reach and ability to generate public awareness and set the agenda.  Furthermore, 268
the greater flexibility of NGOs in using networks has given rise to the new public diplomacy, 
which is “no longer confined to messaging, promotion campaigns, or even direct governmental 
contacts with foreign publics serving foreign policy purposes. It is also about building 
relationships with civil society actors in other countries and about facilitating networks between 
non-governmental parties at home and abroad.”  As per this new approach to PD, government 269
policy is aimed at ‘promoting and participating in, rather than controlling’ such networks across 
borders.  The evolution of public diplomacy from one-way communications to a two-way 270
dialogue model treats publics as peer-to-peer co-creators of meaning and communication.   271
A smart power narrative for the twenty-first century South-Asia is about finding ways to 
combine resources for much needed region-wide development through public goods. As the 
largest power in the region, Indian leadership remains important in regional affairs, but narratives 
such as India’s backyard, and Indian hegemony are misleading about the type pf strategy that will 
be necessary for integration. The appropriate usage of PD and the implementation of top-down 
and bottom-up approaches are crucial.  
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4. Prospects of international mediation  
4.1. Need for mediation 
India and Pakistan have endured strained relations for several decades. Owing to the colonial 
past, both states’ foreign policies determine the prevalence of a Westphalian perspective in their 
international relations. Additionally, cutting off diplomatic ties, mutual expulsion of diplomats, 
cancellation of meetings and sports events alike are redolent characteristics of bilateral affairs. 
Although there is a power asymmetry, both nations are at a mutually hurting statement due to 
mutual antagonism and negative peace. While there hasn't been outright war in the twenty-first 
century, both countries face a signifiant portion of domestic population living in poverty, with 
poor records of human development.  
Bilateral state of affairs have been, and continues to be perceived as intolerable, and neither New 
Delhi, nor Islamabad have been able to unilaterally break the stalemate. Asymmetric hard power 
resources, and outright victory in war have also proved unable to coerce a lasting settlement. 
Bercovitch identified four conditions for the likelihood of mediation to address an international 
dispute: “(a) a dispute is long and complex; (b) the parties’ own conflict management efforts 
have reached an impasse; (c) neither party is prepared to countenance further costs or loss of life; 
and (d) both parties are prepared to cooperate to break their stalemate.”  Analyzing Kashmir 272
under these conditions verifies the underlying degree of intolerance of both parties. Its been 
going on for nearly seven decades, and talks at the highest echelons of government have been 
fruitless to devise a lasting solution. Additional facts such as poor GDP per capita records, low 
 Bercovitch, J. (1992). “The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations,” pp.1-29.272
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literacy, and human development add on to the veracity, as well as urgency for reconciliation 
between the two regional powers. South-Asian states will continue struggling individually to 
maintain their economies in the face of poverty, unless a positive peace between the regional 
powers is ascertained.  
Moreover, scholars have indicated that the security of Pakistan’s substantially growing nuclear 
arsenal might be compromised, which add to the urgency for resolution. Americans fear that 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of militants, either through theft, or with the 
connivance of the intelligence agencies or military.  It can be inferred that this fear is shared by 273
Indians too. Owing to the factual predicaments noted above, the ripeness of timing has been 
manifest for quite some time, and is still salient. The point is to find the right “deal,” which is 
acceptable to all parties concerned. Owing to the comparative case study between India and 
Pakistan in this study, it can be argued that any single state (or non-state) actor would fall short 
of being able to provide an acceptable deal, and a coalition of third party mediators would be 
adept to garner prospects for international mediation. This is mainly due to the indication in the 
case study that singularly, neither the US, nor China would be accepted by both India and 
Pakistan, due to their bilateral dynamics. Nevertheless, they could be part of a coalition, if 
accepted by the conflicting parties. 
Records of previous diplomatic engagement to devise a potential solution has been largely 
fruitless, which in turn have not been successful in satisfying the needs and interests of all parties 
concerned, i.e. India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri people.  The current border which was the 274
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culmination of UN negotiation in 1948, the so called LOC or cease-fire line, has been violated 
virtually a countless number of times over the years. As India and Pakistan have already got on 
the edge of nuclear war before,  coupled with the fact that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal can fall 275
prey to islamic militants,  it can be asserted that mediation is needed, and the time is indeed 276
“ripe” for mediation.  
Furthermore, the civilian population of Kashmir have endured a terrible fate in the past, which 
has continued till the present time. They have witnessed a military occupation by India in the 
Vale of Kashmir, and human rights violations by both militants and Indian forces have been 
documented by noted observers.  The situation is intolerable for the Kashmiris. Additionally, as 277
indicated earlier, regional cooperation, technology exchange, security, and overall human 
development are at a standstill. And in a nuclear era, India and Pakistan can neither afford to 
continue this conflict, nor a full scale war. On the other hand, economic, human development, 
and overall benefits are of immense potential. The need for resolution is clearly evident, and firm 
in context. 
 Hersh, S. M. (1993). “On the Nuclear Edge,” The New Yorker, March 29. 275
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4.2. International multiparty mediation 
As per the prospects of international mediation in the Kashmir conflict, it is believed that 
multiparty mediation will be apposite in terms of increasing such prospects. Scholars regard 
multiparty mediation as a very practical solution to conflicts, which incrementally demand 
inflated commitments at management.  This is compounded by the fact that any single entity 278
(whether a State, regional or international organization, NGO, or prominent individual) is rarely 
either willing (as mediation is a voluntary process), or able to invest as per the demands or 
requirements of a conflict, especially an intractable one like Kashmir.  
Additionally, as previous attempts at mediation involved the UN, USSR, and US which were 
unable to devise a lasting solution. Therefore it can be inferred that more than one party will be 
needed. Consequently, forming a collation of apposite actors who are interested, as well as 
accepted by disputing parties, personifies an attractive alternative.  In such a scenario, it is 279
likely that each of the disputing parties will have solid ties with at least one, or two members of 
the coalition. Furthermore, as by joining a multiparty effort enables actors to pool in their 
resources and skills, it consequently increases the overall leverage that can be applied in the 
mediation process.  This also allows the coalition to expand the pie by adding more and more 280
attractive inducements, e.g. increased trade, security provision, FDI, among others. Moreover, 
regarding the risks associated with involvement in external conflict within domestic 
 See for instance, Vuković, S. (2015). International Multiparty Mediation and Conflict Management, p.40.278
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constituencies of mediators, acting in a coalition generates smaller shares of fiscal burden and 
political risk.  281
Any potential mediator in the coalition must have at least cordial bilateral relations with both 
India and Pakistan. Additionally, they must be legitimate, as well as credible, in order follow up 
on the attractive inducements which were presented during the negotiations. It must be noted that 
this does not mean small states cannot act as effective mediators. As studies have demonstrated, 
small states too are able to mediate effectively, including with the use of coercive and 
manipulative strategies.  Owing to the comparative case study, it can be inferred that small 282
states such as Maldives, and Bhutan can also be potential mediators (especially within the ambit 
of SAARC).  
Moreover, prominent scholars have argued that, “mediators will intervene only when a conflict 
threatens their interests, or when they see an opportunity to advance them.”  Additionally, 283
factors related to the domestic contexts of the parties and the wider international context should 
also be taken into account. In the backdrop of the security architecture in the region, (most 
notably Afghanistan), a mediated resolution (that would ultimately lead to resolution) would be 
in the best interests of significant players such the United States, and NATO members, in 
addition to every other country with an inclination towards economic prosperity.  
There will be real prospects of mediation only when a coalition of mediators who allow the 
parties to see the conflict through alternative frameworks are part of the mediation process. 
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Additionally, owing to the fact that too many third parties in a mediation process are predicated 
with challenges of their own,  an apposite coalition would include three to four mediating third 284
parties. This can be supported by the old dictum: too many cooks spoil the broth. 
Additionally, two crucial challenges that must be overcome in multiparty mediation processes 
include: 1) achievement of adequate cooperation among the mediators; and 2) consequent 
coordination of their activities in the mediation process.  Cooperation is essentially “a situation 285
where parties agree to work together to produce new gains for each of the participants 
unavailable to them by unilateral action, at some cost.”  According to Zartman, cooperation 286
pertains three elements that parties take into consideration. “The first one is the “effectiveness” 
of cooperation as opposed to more conflictual strategies. The second is the cost-benefit 
calculation of cooperating. Finally, actors must consider “playback effects” the reputational costs 
that an actor may suffer for noncooperative behavior. Each one of these elements plays a crucial 
role in parties’ decisions for or against cooperation.”  Cooperation should thus be perceived to 287
be beneficial in terms of self-interest of parties. 
Another related element is coordination, which is not very different from cooperation. 
“Coordination represents a subset dynamic of a larger cooperation process. A precondition for 
successful cooperation is that all parties recognize the mutual benefits of working in concert. In 
other words, coordination is the next step in the process of achieving full cooperation, as parties 
 See for instance Vuković, S. (2015). Chapter 2.;  Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F. O., and Aall, P. (2001). pp.51–67.; 284
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make sure that they do not cross purposes or stumble over each other in their efforts to 
accomplish their shared cooperative goals.”  288
4.2.1 Context of mediation process: timing and ripeness 
Studies have demonstrated, along with the substance of a proposal of peaceful settlement, 
another equally important aspect of mediation is the timing.  The concept of a ripe moment 289
centers on the parties’ perception of a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), optimally associated 
with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe.  Furthermore, “the concept is based 290
on the notion that when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot 
escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal 
degree or for the same reasons), they seek an alternative policy or Way Out.”  Being a 291
perceptual event, while ripeness has not always been seized upon to open negotiations, analysts 
and practitioners have verified relevant occasions.  Touval’s work on the Middle East played a 292
significant role in the inception of the idea of ripeness.   293
In light of the bilateral inability of New Delhi and Islamabad to extricate themselves from a 
mutually hurting deadlock, a mutually hurting stalemate now exists vis-a-vis Kashmir. As neither 
of the conflicting parties is unable to “achieve its aims, resolve the problem, or to win the 
 For a detailed account see Vuković, S. (2012). International Negotiation, pp.265-293.288
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conflict by itself,” such a situation may drive them to “reevaluate their policies.”  Realistically, 294
both regional powers see that their available alternatives either unilateral or bilaterally are 
unlikely to achieve underlying interests or strategic objectives.  Furthermore, “if the parties do 295
not recognize clear evidence that they are in an impasse, a MHS has not (yet) occurred, and if 
they do perceive themselves to be in such a situation, no matter how flimsy the ‘evidence’, the 
MHS is present.”  Therefore it is fundamental that the mediating coalition demonstrate the 296
hurting stalemate to the parties. This holds especially for India, who does not welcome 
mediation, and it would be a challenging endeavor to persuade New Delhi in making 
concessions.  
Additionally, as an extension to the concept of MHS, another notable concept is that of mutually 
enticing opportunities (MEO). As per Zartman, this essentially entails a context where the 
continuance of conflict is presented as a depassé through MHS, and enticing opportunities are 
presented to the parties as an attractive ‘way out.’ This can be traced to the fact that negotiations 
completed by the push of a MHS alone are unlikely to be stable, and lead to a more enduring 
settlement.  In MEO, the negotiators present inducements for a more attractive future to pull 297
the disputing parties out of their conflict, after a MHS has pushed them into a negotiation 
process. “The seeds of the pull factor begin with the Way Out that the parties vaguely perceive as 
part of the initial ripeness, but that general sense of possibility needs to be developed and fleshed 
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out into the vehicle for an agreement, a formula for settlement and a prospect of reconciliation 
that the negotiating parties design during negotiations.”  Mutually enticing opportunities may 298
range between significant interests or foreign policy objectives of the disputing countries, i.e. 
from aid, FDI, and enhanced economic relations, to support in multilateral institutions.  
MEOs cant be determined objectively, which could apply in any and every situation. It is a 
subjective percept, and a deep contextual knowledge of the interests and desires of conflicting 
parties can reveal the appropriate inducements. For instance, to be able to persuade India in 
making Kashmir a joint autonomic protectorate under jurisdiction of both Islamabad and New 
Delhi, there needs to be a significantly enticing offer. Considering the Westphalian perspectives 
of IR in South-Asia, this is a big concession from New Delhi, and would require a big 
inducement, such as permanent membership in the UN security council.   299
Furthermore, Zartman argues that when mutually enticing opportunities, or attractive options are 
not developed in the negotiations, the process essentially remains truncated and unstable, even if 
parties have agreed to suspend violence. The objective here is just to outline these phenomena, 
which are crucial elements for the prospects of mediation aimed at resolving Kashmir. For a 
detailed account of these elements, an overview of the prominent scholars noted in this study is 
recommended. In sum, in addition to the apposite coalition of mediating third parties, the 
elements of ripeness, mutually hurting stalemate, and mutually enticing opportunities are 
fundamental determinants for any true prospects of international mediation at resolving the 
Kashmir conflict. 
 Zartman, I. W. (2001). p.14.298
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4.3. Adversarial nature of relationship between disputing parties  
As the conflict has been endured for a prolonged period of time, one cannot underestimate the 
high threshold for tolerance, in the backdrop of core religious issues, and indoctrinated political 
values. The public rhetoric of India and Pakistan are essentially reminiscent of classic 
Westphalian dynamics, deeming preference to the territory of Kashmir and the image of which 
state acquires it and controls it. In the context of Kashmir, and wider India-Pakistan dynamics, 
the conflict has proven to be the embodiment of structural and cultural violence, as noted earlier 
in this study. In other words, this intractable conflict which kept feeding on its own intractability, 
to use Zartman’s terminology, has institutionalized a history of noncooperation, which provides 
the impetus and justification for military modernization and proliferation (a vested interest in the 
continuation of conflict). These factors severely impede de-escalation.  Furthermore, power 300
asymmetry between India and Pakistan inhibit decision makers in New Delhi from making 
concessions, and ‘losing face’ in the domestic constituency and wider society. Nevertheless, 
these are nullified in a nuclear era, especially when the security of Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal is 
not guaranteed. 
A minimal record of third party intervention in the Kashmir conflict is often justified from 
India’s aversion to outside interference.  New Delhi consistently deems it a bilateral issue, as 301
stated in the Simla declaration of 1972.  This agreement has transformed the previously 302
manifest multilateral context of UN intervention (since the advent of independence), into a 
 Kreisberg, L. (1991). Timing Conditions, Strategies, and Errors, pp.7-9. 300
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bilateral context. This bilateralism was extended to all matters of bilateral concern, including 
Kashmir.  
As a victor in the 1971 war, India was able to coerce Pakistan into signing this agreement from a 
position of strength (in return for large swathes of Pakistani land and POWs). In other words, the 
Shimla agreement mitigated the UN mediation role, including its peacekeeping role in Kashmir. 
This was also antithetical to Pakistan’s territorial claims, which were contingent upon 
international guarantees and involvement. This in turn, instead of altering the status quo of 
Kashmir, contributed to feed on the intractability of the conflict. Additionally, domestic public 
opinion, political opposition prevalent in domestic constituencies of both India and Pakistan, and 
(manipulable) public outcry contribute to inhibit a liberal perspective from decision-makers in 
New Delhi and Islamabad. For this very reason, mediation could provide political cover when 
disputants face high domestic audience costs for unpopular, although potentially prudent 
concessions.   303
Conventional wisdom implies that the domestic context largely impeded previous bilateral 
diplomatic engagement, which also largely affected past efforts at international mediation.  It is 304
widely believed that any sign of weakness in negotiating Kashmir can arouse public outcry and 
vigorous political opposition, and domestic pressure can encourage “government leaders to assert 
demands against adversaries that handicap de-escalation.”  Additionally, New Delhi has serious 305
reservations against secessionist movements that challenge India’s secular democracy. 
Nevertheless, this study counters such conventional assertions, and instead argues that the right 
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deal wasn’t devised, i.e. opportunities weren't enticing enough, which couldn’t simply be refused 
by either India or Pakistan.  
4.4. Strategies, power and bias in mediation 
Strategies  
A fruitful outcome from mediation would require commitment, in addition to effective strategy 
and planning. In terms of strategy, this study primarily relies on Touval and Zartman’s typology 
of mediation strategies. They identify three discrete categories of third party behavior, on an 
ascending level of involvement, that describes the full range of mediation techniques. This 
typology is a) derived deductively from a general framework of mediation relationship that 
includes information, decision-making and influence; b) it can be examined empirically (through 
observations or post mediation documents); and c) it includes all dimensions of mediator 
behavior. These three broad strategies are namely: communication–facilitation, formulation, and 
manipulation respectively.  Analysis in light of this typology illustrates that mediation efforts in 306
the Kashmir conflict has been largely facilitative, and formulative so far. As the current situation 
on the ground makes salient the inherent weakness of the strategies adopted in the past, it 
logically calls for enhanced formulation, and a (persuasive) manipulative strategy in future 
attempts, with the use of inducements or ‘carrots.’  
The use of sticks, or muscle will be unlikely to be able to obtain preferred outcomes. Scholars 
have proposed another conceptualization of mediation styles, which concerns two distinct forms: 
1) Pure mediation; based on “reasoning, persuasion, control of information and suggestion of 
 Touval, S. and Zartman, I. W. (1985). International Mediation in Theory and Practice. Boulder: Westview Press.306
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alternatives”; and 2) Power mediation: like the name itself suggests, mediation with muscle, 
where mediators use leverage or coercion to incentivize the parties to move toward a 
settlement.  Although proponents of the former claim that power mediation is simply not 307
mediation, holistic observers who endorse the utility of leverage in mediation do not dismiss the 
‘pure’ forms of mediation out of hand.  Using Touval and Zartman’s typology, these fall under 308
less invasive mediation strategies of facilitation and formulation, noted earlier.  
The situation in Kashmir is rather dedicate, hence even narrative of coercion might sabotage the 
negotiation process. For instance, China’s human rights records is a widely known justification 
for India’s actions in Kashmir in an attempt to vanquish the secessionist movement. Hence, 
narratives of such inclinations are not likely to be welcomed by New Delhi. To reiterate, a future 
negotiation strategy would still be facilitative to being with, but with more formulation 
(expansion of pie, discussion, MEOs), and manipulation in order to sell the proposed solution by 
presenting enticing opportunities or inducements. Manipulation is important as it allows to 
translate the mediators’ power resources by developing a zone of possible agreement. 
Additionally, the coalition of mediators to resolve Kashmir could be composed of pure, as well 
as power mediators. As a matter of fact, inclusion of both these types of mediators might have a 
positive impact on the negotiation process. Examples of pure mediators could be Maldives and 
Bhutan, whereas examples of powerful mediators are the P5 members of the security council. 
And to reiterate, power resources and its conversion is crucial for success, if that entails 
 Fisher, R., and Keashly, L. (1991). pp.29–42. 307
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resolution on a equitable basis, that fulfills the interests and needs of all parties concerned, i.e. 
the Kashmiri people, India, and Pakistan. 
Power and leverage in mediation  
Studies have identified that in order to elicit concessions from conflicting parties, mediators also 
need to exercise influence by creating pressure and providing incentives for compromise.  Such 309
influence pertains mediators’ resources (both soft and hard power resources), which is translated 
into leverage or bargaining power to obtain desired outcomes in the mediation process.  310
Leverage is believed to be an important element in a mediation process as it “enhances the 
mediator’s ability to influence an outcome.”  Mediation could thus be seen as a “process 311
involving the exercise of power.”  Nevertheless, owing to the previous investigation on the 312
future of power in South-Asia, it can be argued that although mediators need to possess power 
and leverage, but these need to be channeled via a smart strategy, i.e. through soft power of 
attraction and persuasion. Using power by means of coercion is unlikely to work to convince 
neither India, nor Pakistan. In other words, in the context of Kashmir, hard power resources need 
to be converted through soft power of persuasion. Coercion may threaten the fragile security 
scenario in Pakistan, and disenchant India from negotiations altogether. Additionally, it might 
 See for instance Touval, S. (1992). pp. 232-248.; Zartman, I. W.  (1989). pp. 1-17.; Carnevale, P. J. (2002). pp. 309
25-41.;  Favretto, K.(2009). pp. 248-263.;  Betts, R.K. (1994). pp. 20-33.
 Touval, S. and Zartman, I.W. (2006). pp. 427-443.310
 Bercovitch et al. (1991). p-15311
 Smith, J. D. (1994). pp.445-450. 312
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also impede economic relations between New Delhi and the mediators. Therefore, although 
power and leverage are important, equally important is a soft sell, or the conversion of power.  
The biased mediator 
Traditional definitions of mediation encompasses impartiality, as one of the strong attributes of a 
prospective mediator, as embodied in the first chapter and paragraph of the UN Charter.  Lack 313
of vested interest and prestige are believed to be cornerstones of UN mediation. Nevertheless, in 
the context of the Cold War, affluential powers increasingly mediated conflicts, precisely due to 
vested interests. This is also salient in the case of South-Asia. The U.S maintained solid relations 
with Pakistan, whereas USSR and India shared significant ties. Scholars posit, “mediators are no 
less motivated by self-interest than by humanitarian impulses. The mediator is a player in the 
plot of relations surrounding a conflict, and has some interest in the outcome (else it would not 
mediate)”  Additionally, Touval has cited at least 104 international conflicts that were not 314
mediated by UN, but rather by the US, or the USSR, or both jointly, from 1945-1989.  315
Moreover, several scholars have verified the unlikelihood of a third state party to accept to be a 
mediator without its own interests, adding substance to the notion of mediator bias. Rubin 
observed “the inclusion of a third party, thus invites the formulation of a coalition between one 
disputant and the third party, as when the third party favors (or is believed to favor) the position 
 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1, Article 1, Paragraph 1. http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/313
chapter-i/ Accessed on May 19, 2016. 
 Touval, S. and Zartman, I. W. (1985). p-8.314
 See Touval, S. (1992). pp. 232-248. 315
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of one [party] over the other.”  Indeed such bias is identified by noted scholars as a potential 316
factor that can facilitate the conduct of mediation itself.  Additionally, as noted by Touval, “it 317
appears safer to have a superpower play the mediator than risk that superpower aligning itself 
with one’s enemy.”  He also remarks “the additional perception of bias strengthens the 318
mediator’s leverage, since the party that considers itself favored by the mediator will seek to 
preserve its good relations and prevent a rapprochement between the third party and the 
adversary. The party that views the mediator as favoring its antagonist will seek to reverse the 
relationship and win the mediator's sympathy, and one may assume that sympathy seeking can 
preclude escalatory behaviors and possibly encompass de-escalatory ones.”   319
There can be two types of bias in mediation, namely bias of content, and bias of outcome. As 
each mediator is driven by a specific set of interest and goals, bias of outcome can be regarded as 
an intrinsic characteristic of any mediator.  Therefore, if bias is seen by one of the conflicting 320
parties as severely antithetical to its self interests, it is not likely to accept mediation by that 
particular actor. More details on bias, and the exact process of mediation itself is beyond the 
scope of this study, which limits itself to the prospects of international mediation. It is 
fundamental to note however that no matter how biased or unbiased, mediation is voluntary, and 
mediators must be agreed upon by the parties.  
 Rubin, ed. (1981). Dynamics of Third Party Intervention : Kissinger in the Middle East, New York: Praeger 316
Publishers, p-6. 
 See for example, Smith, W. P. (1985). pp.363-372;  Touval, S. (1985).; Touval, S and Zartman, I. W. (1985).  317
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4.5. Mediatory capacity of a regional organization 
Empirical studies have shown that legitimate power is more commonly attributed to international 
organizations than to individual states.  Nevertheless, this depends fundamentally on the type 321
and purpose of the organization. For instance, UN and EU see conflict management and 
resolution as fundamental functions, as outlined in their charters. The EU’s involvement in 
Montenegro is an illustration of legitimate power, as legitimacy was derived from the belief that 
the EU represented a socio-political community that shares particular norms and values and was 
able to prescribe specific behavior.   322
Nevertheless, things may be different for regional organizations in different regional contexts 
and region specific dynamics. For instance, as the case study demonstrated earlier, although 
ASEAN and SAARC are legitimate as regional organizations, their charter and principles 
prohibit involvement in sovereignty related issues, including territorial disputes. Considering 
high regard for mutual non-interference in domestic issues, the legitimacy of the organization 
would be severely compromised if member states attempt to do so without consent and 
invitation. Mediation thus requires the voluntary willingness of mediators in addition to 
acceptance by the parties. According to some scholars, regional organizations are commonly 
classified as pure mediators owing to limited institutions, resources, and mandates.  It can thus 323
be inferred that regional organizations have to resort to facilitation and formation strategies. In 
 Touval, S. (1992). p-244.321
 For details, see Vuković, S. (2015). pp.414-443.322
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the context of South-Asia, although SAARC can provide the platform for mediation, but without 
the ability to manipulate.  
Additionally, “while pure mediators might not carry a specific bias toward one of the parties in 
conflict, they will inevitably possess a bias of outcome they aim to achieve. This bias should not 
be overlooked, as it provides structure and clarity to the parties in dispute on what they may 
expect from the ongoing peacemaking process.”   Therefore it could also act as an impediment, 324
as mediation is voluntary, and sometimes parties to a conflict may reject biased mediators 
(especially if they are pure mediators), who do not have the means to present desired tangible 
benefits.  
SAARC is one of the least institutionalized manifestations of regional integration. For SAARC 
to be an effective mediator in regional conflicts, the cessation of hostilities, and cooperation 
between the two key regional powers is fundamental. This is mainly because without the efforts 
of the two most powerful states of the region, the organization is severely limited in terms of 
power, resources, and legitimacy. For instance, the reconciliation between France and Germany 
was made possible by the formation of the European coal and steel community. In other words, 
ECSC reconciled France and Germany, and facilitated a platform for the cessation of hostilities, 
and eventual cooperation. Consequently, cooperation spilled over into other areas of cooperation 
and the EU was formulated. It was not the French and Germans who decided to end their 
hostilities and establish the ECSC. It was quite the contrary, as the ECSC made the reconciliation 
possible. Essentially then, the French and Germans found a utility in the ECSC (in the backdrop 
of American support) that was attractive as well as convincing enough for them to reconcile. 
 Vuković, S. (2015). p.439.324
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Similarly, there needs to be a utility in SAARC for India and Pakistan to benefit, which can 
attract the two regional powers into reconciliation, and cooperation. One potential avenue for 
making SAARC attractive is through substantial financing and security provision from the US, 
and NATO allies who have significant security interests in the region. Institutional expertise and 
financing from experienced and advanced sources could be the panacea for reinforcing the 
capacity of SAARC. 
The necessary elements pertaining the prospects for international mediation to resolve the 
Kashmir conflict have been noted, namely a) the need for mediation; b) the number of mediators 
apposite for a solution; c) the adversarial context of bilateral relations; d) strategies and bias in a 
mediation process; and e) the capacity of a regional organization, i.e. SAARC. It can be 
concluded that all these elements must be addressed for the prospects of international mediation 
to resolve Kashmir. To go further into the intricacies of mediation is limited by the scope of this 
study. As noted earlier, without the consent of both conflict parties to accept mediation, there will 
be no prospects for international mediation. Although Islamabad welcomes mediation, this stance 
is not shared by New Delhi. Countering conventional wisdom that domestic politics, i.e. political 
opposition, and public outcry are the impediments of India’s non-acceptance of mediation, this 
study asserts that the apposite offer has not been made yet, an offer that New Delhi and 
Islamabad cannot refuse. Additionally, the mediation process have become ever more dynamic, 
bolstered by novel academic insights compared to the last attempt at mediation. A proposal that 
aptly addresses the interests of India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri populace, which is backed by 
significant international support and backing will prove to be sufficient for the resolution of the 
Kashmir conflict. 
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Conclusions and findings  
This study analyses regional integration in South-Asia, by investigating the core issues in the 
region which have played a crucial role in impeding the integration process. Broadly, these are: 
a) regional power rivalry due to the intractable conflict in Kashmir; b) antagonistic foreign 
relations within the region; c) power dynamics within the region; and d) the limitations of the 
regional organization SAARC. As the study of regional integration is very broad and includes 
several elements from different modes of IR thought, this study utilizes a multi paradigmatic or 
eclectic theoretical framework to address its relevant objectives.  
Regional integration is severely hampered by the rivalry between the two regional powers, India 
and Pakistan. Although there is no occurrence of war or direct violence, the structural violence 
still persists, resulting in the prevalent negative peace. Positive peace can only be ascertained 
with the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Kashmir. This can be done via international 
mediation. Additionally, it finds that antagonistic foreign relations of regional member states also 
derails the integration process in South-Asia. In order to alleviate tensions, it is necessary to 
invest in SAARC, and devise platforms for regular dialogue and cooperation.  
This study investigates the bilateral dynamics of the regional powers India and Pakistan, and 
examines the indoctrinated domestic public opinion that hampers political reconciliation (and 
regional integration). It also analyzes the causes of such domestic public opinion, such as role of 
elites, average literacy, socialization process, bare minimum of human development, and so on. 
This study endorses cooperation in these very areas for further cooperation and cessation of 
hostilities. Additionally, influence of external state actors of mutual concern to both India and 
Pakistan were analyzed, which demonstrated the nature of bilateral ties, as well as potential 
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mediatory capacities. Essentially, the US is very likely to engage as a mediator, Saudi Arabia is 
also very likely, but China’s potential role is unclear, owing to its own stakes in Kashmir. 
Furthermore, this study compares two successful versions of regional organizations that embody 
regional integration in Europe and East Asia, i.e EU and ASEAN, and draws some insights for 
SAARC. These insights present and imply direct policy initiatives from the member states, i.e. a) 
a committee of permanent representatives from each member state in the de facto capital in order 
to enhance communication, as well as to serve as a platform for dialogue; b) endorsement of 
bottom-up approaches which includes educational, cultural, entertainment and sporting events, 
NGOs and civil society actors and networks that involve the entire region; c) development, or 
rather reinforcement of regional institutions to support intraregional dynamics including trade.  
This study also also finds that international help and asissitace will be crucial for the integration 
of South-Asia. Just as Europe after WWII was provided with significant assistance in developing 
its economy and maintaining defense, the same also applies to South-Asia. SAARC in particular 
demands significant assistance in institution building and expertise. In the context of SAARC, 
the organization needs to be perceived as an attractive avenue for development, that could benefit 
both India and Pakistan. These benefits should also be tangible which should in turn be perceived 
as more advantageous over war or antagonism. Several prominent states in the international 
system are observer states of SAARC, and they have an incremental role to play in the 
development of institutions for specific purposes. Apart from financial assistance and funding 
from these affluent states who have prevalent security interests in the region, expertise in norm 
formalization, rule of law, education, health care, human rights, among others can be beneficial 
for SAARC. As an example, if half of the amount of assistance provided to Pakistan by the US 
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were to be invested in SAARC, it can be strongly argued that such a course of action would have 
reaped tangible benefits by now. Having noted that, it its not too late, and significant investments 
in SAARC is as welcome as necessary. 
This study investigates the prevalent power dynamics in the region, and examines the future 
modes of power, i.e. soft and smart power, that would act as crucial prerequisites for regional 
integration in South-Asia. As part of a smart strategy to utilize soft power, states can utilize 
public diplomacy as a means to import its image in order to change hearts and minds, as well as 
to indirectly influence the recipient country’s government. Furthermore, it reveals that 
conversion of soft power only as top-down government initiatives will be insufficient to obtain 
desired outcomes, i.e. lasting or positive peace. Equally important are bottom-up approaches 
which include wider civil society networks, transnational NGOs and civil-society actors. 
Potential avenues in this direction are universities, educational and cultural exchanges, sports 
(cricket in particular), film and television, regional entertainment contests, think-tanks, etc. 
Besides government initiatives and policies that aim at regional integration and cooperation, 
ordinary people should also be involved in a regional process.  
This study finds and affirms that a smart power approach by India in particular will be apposite 
to achieve objectives pertaining regional integration. Based on the premises that soft power of a 
country is based on the “moral authority of its foreign policy,” and how attractive it is perceived 
by others, it finds that an equitable resolution of the Kashmir conflict will be apposite for its 
resolution, and future transformation. A novel proposal is outlined in appendix I, which 
essentially entails transforming the entire region of Kashmir into a joint federal protectorate of 
India and Pakistan. The new entity will be funded by both India and Pakistan, in addition to 
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foreign aid and financing from other states. Additionally, it is important that the new entity 
cannot accede to either India, or Pakistan (or any third state) and can claim statehood only after 
crossing certain thresholds.  
International mediation will only be possible with the consent of India and Pakistan, and the 
apposite coalition of mediators will be able to resolve the Kashmir conflict. This can be done by 
either of the following two options: a) either a coalition of third party mediators engage in a 
process with India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir conflict; and b) a coalition of third party 
mediators who are also SAARC observer states work within the ambit of SAARC to resolve the 
Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan.  
This study also finds that resolution of the Kashmir conflict will be intensely challenging, and 
transforming the indoctrinated public opinion from a phase of structural violence will take time, 
in addition to initiatives (both governmental as well as societal). It is believed that resolution, 
and regional integration can be characterized as a movement, in which states and decision 
makers (top-down approach) work in tandem with the wider civil society and its networks 
(bottom-up approach) in achieving preferred outcomes.  
Furthermore, in either of these options, mutually enticing opportunities for India and Pakistan 
must be significant, for the realization that positive peace is more beneficial (including tangibly) 
than antagonism and subsequent structural violence. In sum, the elements of ripeness, mutually 
hurting stalemate, and mutually enticing opportunities are necessary determinants for the 
prospects of international mediation at resolving the Kashmir conflict. As ripeness is a perceptual 
phenomena, it must be seized to demonstrate the hurting stalemate to the conflicting parties 
(poor per capita growth, poverty, human development, among others), and mutually enticing 
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opportunities must be presented which are attractive enough to reconcile (such as infrastructure 
aid for SAARC, bilateral FDI’s, educational exchanges, institutions, and so on).  
This study concludes that the prerequisites of regional integration are: positive peace between the 
regional powers, resolution of Kashmir, institutional development of SAARC, soft and smart 
power in international relations of South-Asia, and international multiparty mediation (to resolve 
the Kashmir conflict). Additionally, there are significant prospects for international mediation in 
the resolution and future transformation of Kashmir, as well as South-Asa. But in order for these 
prospects to be materialized, the elements addressed in this study are fundamental to keep under 
consideration. Manifesting a positive peace thus ultimately depends upon making an offer that 
cannot, or wont be rejected by either Pakistan or India. 
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Appendix I 
Geographical distribution  
Today, Kashmir denotes the region whose parts are administered by India, Pakistan, and China. 
The Indian administered portion is known as “Jammu and Kashmir” which includes Jammu, the 
Kashmir Valley, and Ladakh. The Pakistan administered sphere is known as “Azad Kashmir” and 
the northern areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. A portion of Ladakh, i.e. the Aksai Chin and the Trans-
Karakoram tract falls under Chinese control and administration. A map of the region is attached 
in the following pages, in Appendix II. 
A record for previous mediation attempts 
Every previous attempt at mediation took place during the latter half of the twentieth century. 
The two superpowers during the Cold War were involved once each in the mediation process 
pertaining Kashmir. The USSR acted as the mediator in Tashkent in 1966. The United States 
played a mediatory role in 1990. Since the advent of the first war between India and Pakistan 
after independence, the United Nations was the chief mediator, from 1948-1958. The line of 
control (LOC) that separates India and Pakistan was also devised by the UN. Nevertheless, the 
Shimla Agreement signed in 1972 after the Bangladesh Liberation War, mitigated any 
international involvement between the domestic issues of India and Pakistan, including Kashmir. 
In other words, the international or UN’s role from Kashmir was alleviated with this agreement. 
Although severely antithetical to its interests, Pakistan was coerced to sign this agreement (in 
return for prisoners of war and large swathes of Pakistani territory), as India was the victor in the 
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war in 1971. Islamabad thus had little choice and never consented to this decision. It can be 
argued that this agreement has, indeed further substantiated the intractable nature of the conflict.  
A potential proposal 
It is a challenging endeavor to devise a proposal for the resolution of Kashmir on an equitable 
basis, which is also in the best interests of the Kashmiri populace, India, and Pakistan. This 
means that all parties need to make serious concessions for the larger picture and future 
trajectory of the region. The proposal this thesis project committed to make essentially entails 
transforming the entire region of Kashmir (Pakistan and India administered) into a joint 
autonomous protectorate of India and Pakistan.  This will be a unique political undertaking, 325
wherein governance will be provided by select committees from India and Pakistan. Major 
decisions need to be made on the basis of local parliamentary consensus and representation. But 
the main governing council or committee would pertain permanent representation from India and 
Pakistan, in order to maintain and strengthen consensus. The intricacies of the internal 
mechanism of such an autonomous protectorate is open to debate, and will undoubtedly require a 
lot of time and discussion between the main parties India and Pakistan, in addition to the 
mediating coalition of third parties. Nevertheless, the idea is to essentially transform Kashmir as 
a completely new political entity, referred here as the autonomous protectorate. It is by and large 
an idea based on soft power, which seems relevant, as decades of hard power projection and 
usage have proved fruitless in obtaining preferred outcomes. Furthermore, taking into account 
the cultural and historical affinities, an opportunity should be extended towards manifesting a 
 This proposal is a lucid intellectual undertaking, which is not meant in any way to offense any religious of 325
ideational sentiment. 
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lasting and positive peace. Furthermore, it is vital that Pakistan demonstrates a genuine will (with 
international assistance if need arises) in eradicating islamist terrorism. The objective is to 
transform Kashmir into a bastion of peace and justice, an embodiment of the collective efforts of 
the international community in stabilizing a nuclear hotspot, and one of the most intractable 
conflicts in the world.  
It is believed to be a political experiment of sorts, which will verify whether India and Pakistan 
can establish a positive peace. Security is to be provided in most part as per the agreement 
reached in the negotiation process vis-a-vis Kashmir. International security presence is 
considered to be fundamental, owing to inherent mutual suspicion between India and Pakistan. 
Additionally, international investment will be fundamental, and key to strengthening existing 
institutions, establishing new ones for specific purposes, and financial aid for reconstruction and 
development. Establishment of international civil society and NGO actors will be core 
contributions towards generation of soft power. 
Furthermore, the autonomous protectorate cannot be allowed to accede to India, Pakistan, or any 
third state party, as such an action can sabotage the entire peace process. It can claim 
independence only after institutions have strongly been grounded, and governance capacity is 
demonstrated to the consent of India and Pakistan (if need arises, also the coalition of mediators). 
If such an outcome is reached, it is expected to stimulate regional integration, by demonstrating a 
genuine measure of soft power from the regional powers India and Pakistan. As a result, the 
Kashmiri people will ascertain much deserved autonomy in their native land; Pakistan will gain 
international praise and favor, and benefit tremendously from the consequent regional integration 
and; India would consequently attain permanent membership at the UN security council. 
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Appendix II 
Map of the Kashmir region 
Map developed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Downloaded from: http://
www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kashmir_region_2004.jpg
!145
